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Abstract of Dissertation 
Chemometric Modeling of Select Lanthanides in Solution via Partial Least Squares Regression 
for Material Accountancy and Safeguarding 
 
By 
Edward Kyle Jenner 
Doctor of Philosophy in Chemical and Biochemical Engineering 
University of California, Irvine, 2019 
Professor Mikael Nilsson, Chair 
 
 Utilizing nuclear energy to combat climate change is rapidly becoming necessary to 
mitigate major disruptive events. However, nuclear technology has an inherent dual use concern 
which creates a challenge to the legitimacy of some nuclear energy programs. Ergo, nuclear 
energy must be expanded with care of region and country-specific threats to maintain long-term 
prosperity. One such avenue is implementing spectroscopic on-line monitoring for tracking 
special nuclear material in close to real time. Using UV/Visible spectrum absorbance implements 
a barrier to nefarious tampering of a recycling system by utilizing physical properties unique 
from existing safeguards. In this thesis, optimization of a partial least squares regression model 
built on UV/Vis absorbance was explored, along with probing of a power analysis to better 
understand modeling parameters, and the speciation of neodymium with citrate as may be found 
in advanced nuclear fuel recycling. The models were optimized to maximize accuracy while 
minimizing susceptibility to deception. Ultimately, an accurate on-line model for special nuclear 
material will make nuclear recycling a more globally achievable goal, ergo increasing the 
prevalence of nuclear energy and contributing to climate change abatement.
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Chapter 1: Scope of this Thesis 
Contained in this thesis is the work I conducted to investigate modeling techniques for optimal 
material safeguarding in used nuclear fuel reprocessing. The main thrusts of the work are briefly 
described here. 
1. Analyzed fundamental problems in a geopolitical setting that constrain the nuclear energy 
sector from realizing its climate change abatement potential and suggested a plausible 
case-basis solution. 
2. Explored a power analysis as means for knowing a priori the quality and quantity of 
samples required for a target predictive capability of a model. This would also allow for 
spectrometer equipment sizing. 
3. Elucidated techniques for maximizing model accuracy while reducing false positives and 
preventing nefarious model confusion. 
4. The speciation of Neodymium with Citrate at varying pH was observed 
spectroscopically. The spectral changes were then correlated with [H+] concentration, to 
monitor process conditions such as pH via spectroscopy. 
As every nuclear reactor produces unique composition waste, the recycle make-up will be reactor 
specific. Thus, one research interest is being able to create robust models with multiple 
components, such that a recycle facility could model a multitude of reactors’ fuel. Understanding 
modeling parameters through a power analysis would reveal how to streamline modeling and 
which components are viable for modeling. Finally, nuclear fuel recycling contains an array of 
chemical processes at varying conditions. By observing slight changes due to pH indicative of 
different metal-ligand products forming, UV/Vis spectra can also track important process 
conditions that would be indicative to normal operation and create a further tampering hurdle. 
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Chapter 2: Introduction 
 
2.1: Threat of Climate Change 
In the last fifty years the atmosphere has continuously absorbed massive amounts of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) which has heated the earth’s global average annual surface temperature by about 
1.5 oC1,2,3. This may not sound substantial, but when a 5 oC drop was enough to put most of 
North America under hundreds of feet of ice4, it becomes apparent that this small measure 
implies a lot of change. As this warming has been happening, scientists and activists have 
warned of the dire consequences. Currently, 1 million species are facing extinction due to 
climate change5. Over half of the Great Barrier Reef is dead6. Our largest source of atmospheric 
oxygen is in danger7. The last five years are also the five hottest years on record, in order. These 
are only a small sample of all the evidence pointing towards desperate straits. However, due to 
the efforts of gas and oil companies, along with negligent political influence to sow 
disinformation and confusion, this message was largely ignored and distrusted8-14. Now, as 
climate change has shifted from noticeable and damaging to unignorable and devastating, the 
human race will face challenges unlike anything before. Starvation, dehydration, heat stroke, and 
increased poverty are all guaranteed to partially destabilize society and cause significant death 
tolls3,15. Climate change will also disrupt global security and potentially instigate conflicts as it 
causes instability to countries and heightens tensions16,17. A crisis is unavoidable; but to what 
level the ruin reaches is not solidified, and some time remains to avoid the worst of the possible. 
Scientists suggest reducing global emissions by roughly fifty-percent before 20301 is necessary 
to avoid most threats to societal stability. This will require large scale economic investment in 
scientifically sound approaches on a multi-national level. Further, it will require investment 
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beyond what is economically desirable, as the free-market is not enough to drive necessary 
climate-change solutions. To suggest a potential solution though, we will first dig a little deeper 
into the problem, specifically, CO2 as the culprit of the problem. 
 
CO2 absorbs incident IR radiation at 667 cm
-1 (bending), 1338 cm-1 (symmetric) and 2349 cm-1 
(asymmetric) from our sun, whereas simple diatomics such as oxygen and nitrogen do not 
interact with these wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum. Before reemitting the IR 
radiation, the CO2 has an increased average kinetic energy, which causes more energetic 
molecular collisions, which in turn is an increase in temperature. This effect has been magnified 
across the atmosphere to cause a temperature increase of 1.5 oC over the past few decades (and 
now accelerating to nearly twice the heating rate of the last century), driven by the combusting of 
hydrocarbons as an energy source. This has been accomplished by and large through electricity 
generation; the combustion of fossil fuels create product gases (including heated CO2) and heat 
which generates steam. The expansion of this steam powers a turbine connected to a dynamo 
which uses the spinning of a magnetic field to create an electric field that is the generation of 
electricity for civil use. After combustion, this CO2 is useless and vented to the atmosphere. 
Unfortunately, the creation of CO2 is unavoidable in many scenarios. Case examples are aviation 
or heavy machinery, in which it is nearly impossible to operate on batteries as the force 
generation is too difficult. However, electricity generation for the grid is the largest source of 
CO2 production. Utilizing an alternative fuel source from hydrocarbons is necessary. Many 
activists are entranced by the idea of renewables due to the notion that they are largely 
unintrusive and emissionless. However, this is a misconception. The rare earth elements 
necessary for solar and wind energy require difficult and toxic chemical processes18,19. The CO2 
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generation per quantity of energy roughly ties nuclear with wind, and vastly over solar 
energy20,21.  Further, renewables require a very large amount of land compared to their energy 
production22. These factors make renewables unfavorable in many scenarios. When added to 
their inability to load-follow and operate at all hours of the day or in all geographical regions, a 
grid based on these is not viable. Nuclear energy is not tied to any of these problems however. 
 
2.2: Utilization of Nuclear Energy 
Nuclear energy is a very attractive solution to climate change, but it requires an explanation so 
that argument can be understood. In nature, varying number of protons changes chemical 
properties between elements and within each element the number of neutrons can vary, which 
changes the nuclear properties. One such important example is the two isotopes of uranium, 
Uranium-235 and Uranium-238. When 235U absorbs a thermal neutron (a neutron that is in 
thermal equilibrium with its 
surroundings), the nucleus 
becomes unstable and fissions 
(splits apart) releasing fission 
products, neutrons, and energy23. 
The probability of the neutron 
being absorbed and causing this 
event (instead of being deflected 
or missing) is based on the cross-
section of 235U, which is a calculation based on the physical size of the atom nucleus23. On 
average, the products are 2.5 neutrons per fission event, 200 million electron volts (MeV)23, and 
Figure 2.1. U-235 Fission Product Percent Yield by Mass Number. 
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a fission product X with mass number on average of 95 and Y of average 13724 as seen in Figure 
2.1. The generation of 2.5 average neutrons means the process can be sustained as a chain 
reaction. This defines 235U as fissile.  
𝑈235 + 𝑛1 → 𝑋 +95 𝑌137 + 2.5 𝑛1 + 200 𝑀𝑒𝑉  
Conversely, 238U requires a higher energy neutron to fission, and the neutrons produced from its 
fission are not above the critical energy to fission an additional atom of 238U, so a chain reaction 
cannot be sustained (outside of fast-neutron reactors which are uncommon and not discussed 
further). This distinction means that both 235U and 238U are fissionable, but only 235U is fissile. 
Though the 238U is also fertile material, meaning it can absorb a neutron to become 239U and 
decay to 239Pu, an also fissile material. This release of 200 MeV per atom (on average) means 
235U, enriched and burnt in a nuclear reactor will generate tens of thousands of time more energy 
per kg than gasoline or diesel25. This high energy density is why nuclear power is so attractive. 
As no fuel source is emissionless (renewables are commonly advertised as this but they are 
process emissions free; the production of the wind turbine or solar panel itself generates CO2 
emissions), nuclear energy can produce millions of more times energy on a CO2 expenditure 
basis of current base-load producing methods. By utilizing nuclear energy, we can produce far 
less CO2 for the same amount of energy obtained, and have a better chance of meeting climate 
change goals. This is illustrated by experts who have said nuclear energy is necessary to meet 
climate change goals, and that society will not be stable without nuclear energy26. A further 
argument for nuclear energy, arising again from its energy density, is the land usage. Nuclear 
energy requires a fraction of the land to produce the same amount of energy as renewables. For 
example, the city of Los Angeles is roughly 500 square miles, and by DoE measurements, used 
roughly 23 Terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity in 201627. A back of the envelope calculation 
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using literature values for land requirement per TWh shows that to power the city of LA via 
nuclear energy requires roughly 4 mi2, 307 mi2 via solar, and 460 mi2 via wind energy. Alongside 
the small area usage, nuclear energy is operable at all hours of the day. In fact, some reactors can 
run continuously for nearly a few years without refueling. Additionally, the power generation is 
set by human operation, rather than subject to nature. These traits manifest in nuclear energy 
being able to provide base-load power, which is the bulk of the electricity costs, without the 
variability. Other low emissions technology such as solar and wind are not continuously operable 
at all, and are very much influenced by environmental fluctuations. This restricts renewables 
from being able to provide base-load power, which means even if nuclear was not a better 
option, it would still be necessary. 
 
2.3: Nuclear Waste, Fuel Recycling 
and Proliferation Threat 
Though these factors make it a clear 
candidate for base-load generation and 
climate change abatement, it is not 
without its setbacks. The foremost is the 
waste. Nuclear waste is comprised of 
fuel rods removed from a reactor when 
the population of the fission products is 
sufficient to slow down the nuclear 
reaction to no longer be energy efficient28,29. In many reactors, this point is when the fuel is still 
96% uranium, 1% being 235U29,30. The reason the waste can still be mostly fuel but too inefficient 
Figure 2.2. Radioactive Decay of Nuclear Material Over Time for 
Different Storage Practices. 
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to run is some fission and decay products have massive cross-sections, thus highly reducing the 
chance of continued nuclear reactions with 235U28. The general composition of nuclear waste is 
depicted in the graphic below. Fission products and decay products having half-lives of 
thousands of years (such as 
minor actinide 237Np with 
t1/2 being 2 million years) 
creates a substantial 
problem because nuclear 
waste is radioactive for 
millions of years before it 
decays back to the level of 
natural uranium 
ore29,31,32,33. Even this benchmark point is still a hazard, but is an acceptable one. As modern 
civilization has only lasted a few thousand years, and the nuclear science field is hardly one-
hundred years old, the notion of guaranteeing the safekeeping of nuclear waste for a million 
years is plausible at the very best, to arrogant and destructive at worst33. This problem can be 
solved from a scientific standpoint by utilizing advanced nuclear fuel recycling. Fuel recycling is 
basically the process of taking used nuclear fuel out of a reactor, dissolving the rods in 
concentrated nitric acid, and extracting the uranium and plutonium for reuse as MOX (Mixed 
OXide) fuel29,34,35. The remaining waste can be disposed of, while fresh fuel can be introduced 
alongside waste products that can be burnt within the reactor to create a recycling process. This 
was first developed for the weapons project, as spent reactor fuel was the best source for 
plutonium for bomb utilization. As detailed in Figure 2.2, the waste from the recycling is over an 
Figure 2.3 Elemental Composition of Used Nuclear Fuel. 
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order of magnitude less radioactive in under an order of magnitude less of time. This is a major 
advantage over regular waste storage in that the safeguarding does not need to be as long-lived, it 
drops substantially to more safe levels much sooner. It will still require eons of stewardship, but 
the threat is less severe in a much shorter time. This process can be expanded upon through 
advanced fuel recycling. Advanced fuel recycling is an umbrella term for further separations and 
processing after the uranium and plutonium have been recovered for fuel usage. One method 
under development at US DOE is the Actinide-Lanthanide Separation Extraction Process 
(ALSEP) which separates minor actinides Americium, Curium, and Neptunium from the waste36. 
These three isotopes, though accounting for less than 0.1% of the waste volume, account for the 
majority of the long-lived waste activity. They are then reintroduced to the fuel. This makes the 
fuel proliferation resistant as it becomes extremely radioactive and dangerous to handle, ergo 
theft of the nuclear material is reduced. Because it is in the fuel, during the operation of the 
nuclear plant it becomes exposed to a high neutron flux which will transmute the actinides into 
other products with (most often) shorter half-lives. This process reduces the radioactivity of the 
waste orders of magnitude in a very short time scale. Though the process has to be continuous 
(running the process generates new minor actinides in the fuel which will need to be recycled), it 
will localize the intense radiation to inside of a reactor and in recycling facilities, while also 
creating an equilibrium volume, instead of continuously accumulating. This process can be run 
continually with fresh fuel added to make up the loss from the burnt fuel. In the mid 1900’s, this 
recycling (with less advanced separation) outlined a very convenient and cheap path for 
civilization growth. The atoms for peace program sought to hand over nuclear reactor technology 
along with recycling to allied countries. They could easily generate a vast amount of energy with 
small resource investment, and recycling their fuel drastically lowered their stewardship 
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obligations. This was very attractive as many countries did not possess capabilities to safeguard 
long-lived waste, but could more easily handle the recycled waste. In turn, by giving out the 
technology, the U.S. and its allies were keyed into what capabilities each country had, as well 
with winning favor from said country instead of the favor going to the Soviets. On the 18th of 
May in 1974, this strategy went up in a mushroom cloud37. India had been given help developing 
reprocessing technology along with a nuclear reactor via the atoms for peace program 
(specifically from Canada)35. India used this technology to develop fuel for a nuclear bomb, 
which was believed not possible at the time. This caused Jimmy Carter to ban nuclear fuel 
reprocessing in 1978 in the United States38. This created a precarious state for the U.S., as it had 
signed off on the NPT seven years prior. Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty states 
“1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties 
to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information 
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also 
cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the 
further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the 
territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs 
of the developing areas of the world.”39 
 This put the U.S. in a precious situation as they wanted to discourage countries from pursuing 
nuclear technology, even for peaceful purposes, as it could lead to weapons development. They 
then quickly backtracked from civilian fuel reprocessing programs. Though Ronald Reagan 
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reversed this decision in 198140, it was only moved to an informal ban. As any entity engaged in 
nuclear fuel reprocessing would be denied any government assistance. As all other fuel 
producing entities receive government subsidies, this would lead to the company quickly 
becoming unprofitable. It should also be noted that nuclear energy already receives substantially 
less government assistance compared to other energy producers. Specifically, in 2016, nuclear 
energy received less than $200 million in federal funding, while renewables received almost $11 
billion, and fossil fuels were given $4 billion41. As most nuclear power plants only developed 
interim storage sights, as long-term waste would be reprocessed and stored off sight, this created 
a problem. The long-term storage sites planned would need to be vastly larger as the waste 
volume would not decrease by 30% via fuel reprocessing, and also the re-engineering of the 
entire site was required as one-million year safeguarding instead of one-thousand year 
safeguarding was necessary. For this reason, there is currently no long-term fuel storage. 
 
2.4: Conclusion 
This thesis seeks to propose a solution on two fronts; political and scientific. First, research via a 
case-study on Saudi Arabia and their proliferation concerns seeks to find a middle ground 
between allowing a country to grow a nuclear energy sector while minimizing the threat of a 
weapons program. Second, novel techniques were explored to maximize robustness of material 
monitoring to safe-guard against special nuclear material theft. 
 
The proposed solution is to invest in multinational fuel reprocessing and recycling centers, 
similar to the enrichment bank in Khazakstan42. This will provide a basis to recycle fuel at a 
global level, while delocalizing the capabilities, so one country does not have complete control 
  
11 
 
over the proceedings. Thus, it would be more difficult to operate a clandestine research effort for 
weapons development. One ideal scenario for implementation would have been Saudi Arabia, a 
country that has both legitimate enrichment needs and weapons concerns.  
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Chapter 3: Case Study for Proposed Multinational Plan for Sensitive Nuclear Technologies 
This chapter was based upon research between Yeo-eun Kang and myself under the supervision 
of Professor Man-sung Yim as part of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Education and Research 
Center Fellowship at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology. 
 
3.1: Introduction to Saudi Arabia 
The global response to climate change overall will be devastating. Everywhere will see economic 
and physical turmoil, loss of life and resources, and harsher living conditions. However, the 
degree and exact nature of the problems will vary geographically. Some areas of Southeast Asia 
will experience extreme flooding and unrelenting monsoons while parts of the U.S. will see 
drought and desertification. Though both negative, these regions will have drastically different 
problems. Much like the results of climate change, the response will vary greatly in detail 
depending on region. Developing countries will have a small CO2 output and thus less of a role 
in climate change abatement as compared to China or the U.S., i.e. the major CO2 contributors. 
Likewise, France, largely powered by nuclear energy, is already part of the solution and less of 
the problem. Though overall the general solution is to lessen CO2 output by incorporating more 
nuclear energy into their grid, each country will need a unique plan to accomplish this. One such 
very nuanced case is Saudi Arabia. 
 
Saudi Arabia is an oil rich country in the Middle East on the Arab peninsula. The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA) holds a long rivalry with Iran. It has also developed a loose ally in the 
United States partly due to its large oil production and the U.S.’s oil consumption. Saudi Arabia 
is a very wealthy country, with a large (20k) GDP per capita. With changing dynamics in the 
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Middle East surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia has been vocal in their concerns 
and adamant on being involved with the handling of Iran and their nuclear capabilities. Saudi 
Arabia looks to develop nuclear power infrastructure and may seek enrichment capabilities, 
additionally. Though there are proliferation concerns regarding all areas of the nuclear fuel cycle, 
many of which Saudi Arabia has yet to alleviate, this work focuses on specifically on enrichment 
and its proliferation potential in KSA. This focus outlines how a nuanced approach to a country 
can provide a more acceptable plan for climate change abatement and avoid pitfalls of taking a 
general blanket approach. 
 
3.2: Saudi Arabian Nuclear Interests 
 
Saudi Arabia wants nuclear capabilities for multiple reasons and is attempting to blur the lines 
such that limitations to prevent weapons could appear to be an attack against energy 
development. If the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can convince the rest of the world that its power 
and enrichment capabilities are solely peaceful in nature, they will be allowed to have their cake 
and eat it too when it comes to being a nuclear-energy producing state. Therefore, it requires 
accurate detailing on their plans and pursuits to prevent this blurring of lines. Therefore, this 
section will detail Saudi Arabia’s peaceful interests in nuclear energy and their merits, then 
examine concerns and questionable intent. This section will provide a factual basis for ideas on 
decreasing proliferation risk in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Currently, Saudi Arabia consumes over twenty-five percent of its oil and natural gas production 
for energy generation43. This consumption is projected to grow substantially in the coming years, 
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and without pursuing counter-measures (e.g. production efficiencies, further oil exploration, 
utilizing other fuel sources), this consumption will grow to sixty percent of KSA’s fossil fuel 
production by 2030. Coupled with oil44 and natural gas being the bulk share of Saudi Arabia’s 
revenue sources, domestic consumption of resources will lead to economic ruin for the kingdom. 
To prevent this, Saudi Arabia has decided to pursue nuclear energy to allow for increase in oil 
production45 along with development of reneweables43,46,47. Originally, KSA aimed to develop 
17 gigawatts-electric (GWe) by 2040 produced via sixteen large-scale reactors43,48. However, 
their plans have been scaled back to two reactors producing roughly 3 GWe, potentially due to 
economic challenges of their original target49. Recently it has been discovered that Saudi Arabia 
has a research reactor, provided by Argentina, and expected to be operational by the end of 2019. 
Should they return to their original goal such as still listed on their atomic energy agency 
website48, this contract would be worth close to one-hundred-billion-dollar for the development 
of the nuclear facilities. Currently, Saudi Arabia is entertaining a shortlist of five providers for 
nuclear capabilities which are China, Russia, South Korea, France, and the United States50,51. 
Aside the supplementation of oil production, nuclear energy is attractive due to its desalination 
potential. Saudi Arabia has no natural rivers52 and very little fresh water sources. Consequently, 
KSA has very large desalination demands53,54, and consumes a great deal of energy to meet it53. 
To this end, nuclear energy is further attractive as potentially using its waste thermal heat for 
desalination can be very efficient55,56. Thus employing nuclear energy for desalination not only 
lowers energy requirements overall as efficiency increases, but also incorporates a new energy 
source, further reducing the oil consumption for desalination. On top of diversifying their energy 
grid, Saudi Arabia is interested in nuclear energy to diversify their economy. Saudi Arabia wants 
to grow its nuclear expertise to eventually be an exporter of technology57. KSA also wants to 
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utilize their uranium ore reserves for their nuclear energy43,58,59,60, generating wealth from a raw 
material outside of its large oil reserves. 
 
Saudi Arabia’s use for nuclear energy is understandable. Saudi Arabia has the largest GDP in the 
Middle East, largely due to its successful utilization of its oil reserves. Undoubtedly, any strategy 
that can free up more oil for sale (such as employment of nuclear energy) will be worth 
examining. Coupled with oil being a non-renewable resource, even with advances in oil 
extraction techniques, efficiencies in processing, and successful exploration, the country would 
do best by taking steps to preserve or better utilize their oil. A set-back to this argument is that, 
though there is economic sense of replacing oil with nuclear, there is evidence that natural gas 
would be even more lucrative than nuclear61. Though evidence shows that nuclear is more 
ecofriendly than oil or natural gas as far as emissions62, that is believed not to be a motivation 
with KSA45. This, overall, casts doubt on KSA intents for nuclear energy. With an exponentially 
increasing population, desalination requirements will grow substantially also. Employing nuclear 
energy’s efficiency in desalination is a very logical decision and gives strong credit to KSA’s 
nuclear ambitions. There are questions raised around KSA’s decision to grow human resources 
to become a nuclear technology exporter. As a country with little nuclear expertise, it will be a 
large time investment to catch up to current expertise, and even longer to grow some competitive 
advantage over other countries. Whether nuclear energy technology will remain a lucrative 
export over the time frame to grow this human capital is worth questioning, along with if this is 
the most effective investment of Saudi Arabian resources. The acceptable dimension to this 
decision is that by developing nuclear energy infrastructure, they will have laid the groundwork 
for human resource development in nuclear energy. Ergo, growing expertise for technology 
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exporting would eventually be achievable. Finally, the claim that utilizing their uranium ore is 
economically efficient is unfounded. Only initial surveys of the ore have been done to determine 
potential quantity. However, if this ore is suitable for mining and milling prior to enrichment to 
reactor grade has not been determined. Compounding this, even if it was reactor grade, it is 
questionable if developing an entire uranium mining sector is economical to support a small 
nuclear energy operation (assuming they stick to 3 GWe). 
 
Concerns over Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy interests grow when examining their dialogue over 
uranium enrichment, a key step in developing nuclear energy but also nuclear weapons. 
Mentioned prior, Saudi Arabia is looking to negotiate a nuclear deal with several countries, 
however it is known that it is looking to keep enrichment rights open in its talks with the United 
States43,61,63,64. Though Saudi Arabia is not looking to begin enrichment immediately, the fact 
they are negotiating to keep the option on the table brings worry. This is exacerbated by the 
Trump Administration and its failure in taking nuclear threat as a serious issue. It is already 
known that there were talks to allow Saudi Arabia enriching and reprocessing technology in 
exchange for guarantee that American companies would be picked to build reactors. Also, the 
Trump Administration authorized seven nuclear technology transfers to KSA. This was all done 
knowing KSA has threatened to leave the NPT to create weapons to imitate and intimidate Iran. 
Another reason to deny KSA enrichment is that their argument to allow for enrichment lacks 
hard substance. Saudi Arabia has claimed enrichment will be economic for the country57. This is 
not truthful; the economics of enriching has deteriorated substantially over the last decade and 
are expected to continue to do so65,66. Pursuing enrichment does become more reasonable for 
programs above 10 GWe though67. The argument is that with substantial nuclear energy, the 
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economic security of controlling a larger energy source outweighs the economic burden from 
enrichment. But following this logic through for KSA, who is scaling back from 17 to 3 GWe 
(below the point this trade off makes sense), their original argument was to free up resources for 
economic prosperity. Thus, turning around and eating economic surplus delivered to support 
enrichment is counterproductive. Further, Saudi Arabia has options for reactor fuel besides 
enriching uranium themselves. Saudi Arabia could buy fuel from likely any supplier, as they are 
all seeing dwindling economic gains and would enjoy additional revenue from a new customer. 
If Saudi Arabia fears a lapse in their fuel supply, the IAEA fuel bank exists exactly to provide 
fuel, so countries do not pursue enrichment68. Thus, KSA is guaranteed fuel if they forgo 
enrichment. This all culminates in strong suspicions in Saudi Arabia’s claim in enrichment as 
purely peaceful, which is only exacerbated by the nuclear threats made by the kingdom. 
 
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in an interview with 60 Minutes, “Saudi 
Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a 
nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”69 As the deputy prime minister and 
minister of defense, a statement of pursuing nuclear weapons from his is very serious. He also is 
not the only official to echo this sentiment also. Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and former Saudi Arabia General Intelligence Directorate, Prince Turki al-Faisal, have 
both stated Saudi Arabia will pursue nuclear weapon capabilities if Iran attains them70,71,72. Fears 
are further exacerbated by KSA efforts to prevent intervention. Saudi Arabia has not yet signed 
the Additional Protocol73 (AP) which allows for more intrusive inspections74, nor has it signed 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty75 (CTBT) and not only does Saudi Arabia have a 
Small Quantities Protocol76 (SQP) which severely limits amount of inspection allowed in the 
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country, but theirs is based on the original text from 2005 which requires far less stringent 
reporting77. 
 
The information laid out previously points that Saudi Arabia clearly has viable use for nuclear 
energy, and unfortunately a clear willingness to pursue nuclear weapons. However, desire and 
willingness are very different from ability. Thus, before recommendations are made, a dialogue 
on potential enrichment and hence weapons capabilities, specifically their human and natural 
resources, is required. 
 
3.3 Saudi Arabian Enrichment and Proliferation Potential 
 
The enrichment process inherently has proliferation concerns; however, every country exists 
within its own unique conditions that can influence this threat, and Saudi Arabia is no exception. 
Thus, an elucidation on enrichment is beneficial as it will detail the practicality of Saudi Arabia 
mastering the process.  
 
Due to many physical aspects (such as only a slight atomic weight difference78 between isotopes) 
uranium enrichment is a difficult technology to develop. Gaseous centrifuges are spun to nearly 
one million times the acceleration due to gravity which requires not only a large amount of 
energy79 but constrains materials to be both light weight and very durable. One obvious 
candidate that has been utilized heavily is aluminum, and hence certain aluminum exports are 
closely monitored and regulated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Unfortunately, Saudi 
Arabia’s aluminum production is hundreds of thousands of tons annually80. Though a good share 
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of the aluminum production is for construction and building uses81,82 which may not have the 
necessary production capabilities for centrifuges, the material mining and refinement processes 
are available. This enhances proliferation risk in KSA in that centrifuges could be built secretly 
without NSG detection, should the Kingdom obtain enrichment capabilities. 
 
As detailed previously, Saudi Arabia does have substantial uranium reserves. Unlike in the 
energy sector, where the quality of uranium ore effects the economics of the energy produced, in 
weapons development, the goal is security, not financial gain. Thus, Saudi Arabia could pursue 
weapons development and not require an outside vendor for raw uranium ore. Of course, buying 
it would be cheaper than developing their own production, but by controlling it themselves, they 
could skew production numbers and hide their true capabilities. With KSA’s current mineral 
industry80 being sizeable in both mining and refining capabilities, there is potential to refine their 
own uranium ore, and skirt another NSG safeguard83. 
 
Human resources are also an immediate and imperative necessity, should Saudi Arabia pursue an 
indigenous weapons program. The common modality of uranium enrichment is gaseous 
diffusion65,78 during which centrifugal acceleration will cause a slight separation of Uranium-235 
and Uranium-238 to the interior and exterior cylinders within the centrifuge. These two gas 
streams flow into additional centrifuges to achieve further separation. The total arrangement of 
centrifuges can contain hundreds of units and are known as a ‘cascade’. Further extreme care is 
needed to prevent leakage of the gas product, due to both the gaseous uranium hexafluoride 
having a high chemical toxicity78 and the value of the enriched uranium. This culminates in the 
successful development of an enrichment process requiring high precision engineering and 
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science78,83,84. Saudi Arabia does not yet have substantial nuclear manpower but are currently 
growing it57. Currently receiving assistance from Argentina, it is in the process of training reactor 
operators. Literature searches do reveal that there is significant expertise in chemical diffusion in 
KSA, however it is generally focused around water desalination. Further, KSA has reached 
agreements with both China85 and South Korea86 for development in human resources and 
nuclear capabilities. Specifically, China will help Saudi Arabia develop its nuclear regulatory 
program, production of high-temperature gas reactors (HTGR), and most importantly, it’s 
intellectual property85. South Korea and Saudi Arabia have focused on helping KSA develop 
both SMART technology (SMART technology is a type of Small Modular Reactor, or SMR) 
alongside human resources in nuclear capabilities86. Though these technical capabilities are 
vastly different from uranium enrichment, they show that Saudi Arabia can achieve both 
importing nuclear technology and intellectual capability. These factors suggest KSA can 
overcome the difficulties in enrichment and obtain a program, should they choose to pursue it. 
 
The last resource of note here is economic. Outside of technical difficulties, a huge barrier to 
nuclear weapons development is the cost88,88,89 (though North Korea has bucked the trend90).  
With a GDP over $600 billion91 and billions of barrels of oil reserves92, Saudi Arabia is a rather 
wealthy country. They could thus develop a weapon program, whether a more conventional or a 
North Korean styled route. 
 
The summation of Saudi Arabia’s enrichment and thus proliferation potential is that its plausible. 
The kingdom possesses resources such as uranium and aluminum which could be quite 
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exploitable for indigenous development of enrichment without detection. Also, though 
indigenous development is rigorous and costly it is not impossible for the kingdom. 
 
3.4 Viewpoint Interpretation of Information 
 
For ideas to gain support and stimulate healthy discourse, they not only require a strong factual 
basis, but an understandable and realistic interpretation of the facts. Here, the previous section 
shall be examined for a speculation on potential and likely outcomes. 
 
Examining the situation in full, Saudi Arabia is truly posed to prosper from developing nuclear 
energy, and honestly wants to. With the Kingdom’s large desalination requirements, utilizing the 
efficiency of nuclear energy for this process is naturally attractive. Further, by establishing 
nuclear powered desalination, KSA frees up oil consumption to be exported instead of consumed 
domestically, generating more wealth for the country. The economic gain is further advanced by 
a nuclear sector, should Saudi Arabia follow through with plans to be a reactor technology 
exporter and thus further diversify their economy. These desires are echoed in some of KSA’s 
actions in the nuclear field. Establishing a regulatory committee85,90,93 is arduous and would be a 
waste of time and resources should Saudi Arabia not truly hope to build a nuclear energy 
program. 
 
The true worry is that Saudi Arabia truly desires nuclear energy and is also wanting to take 
advantage of their program to become a latent nuclear weapon state61. Saudi Arabia likely does 
not fully want to commit to a weapons program61,94,95 that is both costly and dangerous. 
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Undertaking nuclear weapons development would exhaust large amounts of recourses, further 
destabilize the region, heighten global tensions, strain or even eliminate alliances, and potentially 
put KSA in the crosshairs of sanctions. One expert asserted, speaking on their want to develop 
weapons to threaten Iran, “..if they want to imitate Iran, then they should no longer be regarded 
as an ally of the United States.” As the Senate resolution to end the war in Yemen drew President 
Trump’s first veto, relationships are already strained between the two countries. However, Saudi 
Arabia’s behavior indicates that they want a nuclear option. Plenty of statements by Saudi Arabia 
itself69,72 indicate a willingness to pursue weapons which seem to be more than boasts or threats. 
Saudi Arabia has pursued agreements with the United States to keep open their enrichment 
rights50,57,59,64,96, should they buy nuclear technology from the U.S. The contents of the 
agreement talks have not been fully diverged but is quite worrying97,98, and to quote 
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, “Unfortunately, from the little we do know from the 
Administration, it is looking at this deal in terms of economics and commerce, and national 
security implications only register as a minor issue, if at all.”99 This shows serious concern over 
the potential for Saudi Arabian proliferation. Admittedly, Saudi Arabia has consistently said it 
wants the option open, not necessarily start immediately, but this is hardly comforting, as the 
logic does not show they would keep the option open without trying to engage in enrichment. 
This conclusion stims from multiple behaviors. As mentioned, they have claimed their uranium 
is economical to extract and enrich. Even if the ore is reactor grade, it would not be economical 
to enrich, and they have not even proved it is reactor grade. Further, as they have shied away 
from initial plans of 17 GWe, extracting uranium would be way below the threshold for 
enrichment to be desirable from an energy security perspective, which hints at ulterior uranium 
utilization plans, such as weapons. These concerns also arise from KSA’s lack of adherence to 
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certain nonproliferation regimes. As mentioned earlier, KSA has yet to modify its SQP, sign the 
CTBT or sign the AP. Though they have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons100 (NPT), this is largely seen as insufficient, especially for a country seeking nuclear 
energy capacity. This gives concern that KSA wants the ability to go undetected, should it pursue 
weapons capabilities. 
 
Based on information laid out, it appears Saudi Arabia wants to have its nuclear power and keep 
the option to develop weapons too. Saudi Arabia is largely suspicious of Iran101, and because 
Iran is years ahead of nuclear technology development, Saudi Arabia feels pressured to match. 
Since successful development of a weapons program takes years, if not decades, Saudi Arabia is 
pushing to develop as much of a nuclear field without actually developing weapons. Thus, if or 
when Saudi Arabia feels it needs nuclear weapons, they will not be years out from obtaining 
them. Simply put in meteorological terms; Saudi Arabia is a nuclear weapons watch, but not a 
warning. 
 
3.5 Recommendations to Impede Saudi Arabian Proliferation 
3.5.1 No Context Recommendation 
 
The foremost recommendation is that Saudi Arabia signs the AP and revokes its SQP, regardless 
of any other action. Whether KSA increases their target to 17 GWe or not, abandons their 
enrichment option, etc., it is necessary to have an AP to allow for IAEA inspections and 
verification along with not having an SQP. In the SQP version in force in KSA76, reporting is not 
required up to 2 lbs. of plutonium102 and KSA does not have to reveal the development of a 
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nuclear facility until only on 180 days prior to introducing nuclear material. This lack of 
reporting was shown to be an obvious problem when it was discovered KSA already has a 
research reactor facility underway, that could be operational within the year. With the SQP 
revocation, should Saudi Arabia pursue nuclear proliferation, the distance from violating their 
agreements to achieving nuclear weapons is more daunting, and proliferation is more strongly 
discouraged. This discouragement would be enhanced by signing the AP, which would allow for 
more strict verification. Note should be made that KSA should sign the Model Additional 
Protocol, i.e. not having provisions that weaken verification and monitoring capabilities, as was 
the case in India61. Finally, Saudi Arabia should sign the CTBT. This will create further legal 
obligation for KSA not pursue weapons, as weapons testing is seen as a vital aspect of weapons 
development. The Kingdom may have an initial response that they do not want weapons, 
therefore they do not need an agreement against testing; however, KSA has stated interested in a 
nuclear weapon free middle east95. Assistance towards this goal could be a bargaining point for 
their CTBT signing. These recommendations would all prove helpful in preventing proliferation 
in any path Saudi Arabia and are suggested alongside any of the subsequent scenarios listed 
below. 
 
3.5.2 No Enrichment within Saudi Arabia 
 
With the current plans remaining at 3 GWe of nuclear energy, Saudi Arabia must not receive 
agreements to allow for enrichment. Enrichment is already uneconomic, as detailed above. 
Especially if the Kingdom keeps its nuclear capacity at 3 GWe, it is illogical to develop an entire 
enrichment facility when cheap fuel is readily available on the current market. If Saudi Arabia 
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does switch back to a 17 GWe (or any target above 10 GWe), it is still suggested to pursue Saudi 
Arabia forgoing enrichment. To enhance the attractiveness of this recommendation, multilateral 
fuel arrangements can be made. Foremost, a contract with more than one country to provide the 
nuclear fuel would reduce the leverage over KSA their fuel suppliers would have, as another 
country could switch from partial to total contract fulfillment. Seeing as KSA is in talks for 
reactor technology from multiple countries which could provide nuclear fuel65,78,103,104, they 
could include terms about fuel procurement in the reactor purchase. A multilateral agreement 
between the fuel provider(s), KSA, and the IAEA to keep a set amount of fuel for Saudi Arabia 
on hand at the IAEA international fuel bank in Kazakhstan would strengthen this agreement. 
Keeping the fuel on hand in KSA is suggested against as their current behavior makes them a 
proliferation worry, and minimizing their nuclear material is desirable. But also, by having the 
fuel out of the hands of the provider, it removes Saudi Arabia’s fears over energy security. 
Finally, another resource exists in the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) in 
Angarsk, Siberia65,96. Saudi Arabia could seek membership to the IUEC, which could provide 
them enriched fuel without giving them enrichment technology. 
 
3.5.3 Allowance of Multilateral Saudi Arabian Enrichment 
 
Should attempts to outright forgo enrichment fail, Saudi Arabia should agree to a limited 
enrichment program. Limitations should come in the form of both stewardship and capacity. Any 
agreement to keep open Saudi Arabian enrichment rights should come with compromises that 
any facilities are not solely built, owned, or operated by KSA. The level and nature of foreign 
ownership and operation is not analyzed here as it would require coordination of contractors, 
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Saudi Arabian representatives, and others. But obviously, the less control KSA has, the better. 
Having partial foreign ownership and operation of the facility will heighten the scrutiny of their 
enrichment. Though nonnatives would not be involved in safeguards and verification, they would 
be involved with mass balances, sales and distribution which would limit Saudi Arabia’s 
freedom to divert material unannounced. For construction and operation of facilities and 
technology, as much as possible should be ‘black-boxed’, i.e. Saudi Arabia given no sensitive 
information or data on the process. This will require larger difficulties in reverse engineering 
centrifuge technology. There remains the threat of if Saudi Arabia was to kick out operators and 
assume complete control, they could eventually attain weapons grade uranium. Again, this 
becomes unpreventable if enrichment within Saudi Arabia is allowed which is why the previous 
recommendations are safer and more desirable. But to at least slow this process and discourage 
it, which would give sanctions and political intervention more time to act, the enrichment 
capacity of any facilities should be limited. 
 
Limitations on Saudi Arabian enrichment capabilities would strengthen the confidence in KSA 
not pursuing enrichment for weapons by enhancing the difficulties associated. Limiting uranium 
enrichment capabilities to a narrow operating regime would make energy security a sacrifice for 
weapons development, which would be a large disincentive to KSA. To recommend reasonable 
limits on enrichment, an understanding of Saudi Arabian power needs is necessary. First, the 
assumption is made that the enrichment is allowed due to KSA going above 10 GWe in 
enrichment for reasons discussed above, so a model case of KSA growing from 3 to 17 GWe 
nuclear is used. As Saudi Arabia has not yet decided on a supplier or design for its reactors50,51, 
the burnup of 55 Gigawatt-day per metric ton of uranium (GWd/MTU) is used, which is close in 
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value to an APR1000, representing an example of current reactor technology. Regardless of 
cascade or centrifuge design, the separative work unit (SWU) per mass basis follows Equation 1 
79. SWU is the work required, P is the mass flow of the product (enriched stream), T the mass 
flow rate of the tails (depleted uranium), and F the mass flow rate of the feed (natural uranium). 
The value function, V(x), is based on the concentration (x) in mole fraction of the stream and 
follows Equation 279. 
 
SWU=P∙V(x_P )+T∙V(x_T )-F∙V(x_F)  (1) 
V(x)=(1-2∙x)∙ln⁡((1-x)/x)    (2) 
 
Basic reasonable assumptions are made to outline production requirements for Saudi Arabia. 
First, they would not likely start production on all plants simultaneously, as their power needs 
are expected to grow, they will grow production with it; taking time to produce their full nuclear 
fleet will also prevent a rapid consumption of economic resources. A decade was chosen as a 
reasonable period for the additional nuclear capacity to come online. Second, as experience 
breeds efficiency, a slight exponential curve to the power generation is applied, as facilities 
would come on-line quicker. Third, as the original plan was 17 GWe from sixteen large scale 
power plants, roughly 1 GWe per power plant is used. Fourth, as all current SMR plans are for 
under 100 MWe, they contribute little to the requirement for fuel. Fifth, as shutting down an 
enrichment cascade is quite undesirable (as achieving steady-state equilibrium for the separation 
is very difficult65,79), it is more reasonable to keep cascades running continuously, thus added 
enrichment capacity is via new cascades that can be installed independently, rather than 
expanding current cascades. Further, calculations are made based off cascades of 90 machines 
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with an average SWU of 300 per machine79, such as in an AC100 design. This is chosen as 
AC100’s are made from composites that are not produced in KSA, so should the country reverse 
engineer the design, they would need to modify it for aluminum or still seek outside help for 
fabrication. Finally, fuel stream conditions are specified based on industrial norms of 0.7 percent 
for the feed via natural uranium, 0.1 percent tails65,79 for U.S. standards, and 4.8 percent fuel, as 
specified from Saudi enrichment desires for SMART units65. This will require an obvious 
necessity of material accountancy in the tails, product, and feed. Further, limitations on the 
centrifuge operation via software and/or mechanical constraints are suggested, though the 
method of implementation for those constraints likely lie outside of public knowledge. 
 
Figure 3.1. Nuclear Power Generation Increases as 17 GWe is Achieved Over a 10-year Period. Enrichment 
Capabilities Increase Over the Same Window. 
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Using both assumptions and known values, a limitation on enrichment capacity is generated such 
that domestic production never exceeds eighty-five percent of consumption. The argument is that 
by keeping production below consumption, they are always required to seek additional 
enrichment sources out of their control. Thus, to pursue higher enrichment for weapons, they will 
either forgo part of their own enrichment needs, causing turmoil via power lapses, or increase 
purchases which can be monitored internationally. Figure 1 details the increase of nuclear power 
capacity in GWe and a trailing enrichment capacity in kSWU/yr. Equation (1) and (2) allow for 
calculation of kSWU/yr required to meet energy demand. This is shown in Figure 3.2 where also 
a near constant amount of enriched fuel is imported. In Figures 3.1 and 3.2, it is clear enrichment 
capacity does not grow linearly with capacity, nor is imports constant. This is due to cascades 
being installed in unit intervals as shown in Table 3.1, so the increase in a production cascade 
can only happen when it will not bring production to over eighty-five percent of fuel needs. In 
years where fuel demand increases more than production is allowed, imports increase as seen in 
Figure 3.2. Effort was taken to also keep imports as roughly constant, as supplier companies 
would prefer steadier income. To allow operation of a centrifuge facility in 2030, construction 
should start as late as possible such that down-time does not happen or is minimized. Further, the 
facility should be built to accommodate future cascades, though cascades themselves are not 
installed or operated until the given year specified in Table 3.1. It is assumed 2040 would be the 
steady-state conditions for the facility. 
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Figure 3.2 Domestic production of enriched fuel increases with demand. A roughly constant amount is 
imported to supplement domestic production. 
 
This capacity lay-out is not the only viable option; rather a suggestion of one possible option and 
explanation of the logic such that it could be recreated, should conditions change. Certainly, if 
the timeline, energy target, or reactor design (thus fuel requirements) change, all these 
calculations would need to be redone. Also, calculations would change based on centrifuge and 
cascade design, as well as product and tails specifications. Additionally, this solution does not 
guarantee nonproliferation, but is to merely slow down the proliferation process and increase the 
opportunity cost, should Saudi Arabia engage in it. 
 
3.5.4 Saudi Arabian Sole Enrichment 
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Should Saudi Arabia receive sole guarantees for sole ownership and operation of any domestic 
enrichment facilities (a worst-case scenario), at the very least, capacity limitations should still be 
imposed. Though even with such limitations, it would be assumed over time Saudi Arabia would 
acquire weapons grade uranium to. This is undesirable, and only suggested if it is believed Saudi 
Arabia will develop uranium enrichment regardless, so at least the timeline of weapons grade 
uranium procurement is known. Thus, the same process condition restrictions listed above are 
suggested. This scenario is not evaluated further as it would evolve into descriptions of direct 
interventions, sanctions, and other avenues beyond the scope of this research. 
 
Proposed enrichment capacity conditions 
Year Enrichment 
Capacity 
(kSWU/yr) 
Product (MTU/yr 
@4.8% U235) 
Feed (MTU/yr 
@0.7% U235) 
Tails (MTU/yr 
@0.1% U235) 
Cascades 
of AC100 
2030 270 16.8 169.6 152.8 10 
2031 405 25.2 254.4 229.2 15 
2032 405 25.2 254.4 229.2 15 
2033 540 33.6 339.2 305.6 20 
2034 675 42.0 424.0 382.0 25 
2035 810 50.4 508.8 458.4 30 
2036 810 50.4 508.8 458.4 30 
2037 945 58.8 593.6 534.8 35 
2038 1215 75.6 763.2 687.5 45 
2039 1350 84.0 848.0 763.9 50 
2040 1755 109.2 1102.4 993.1 65 
Table 3.1. Specifications of centrifuge operation conditions during ramp up period. 
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3.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Saudi Arabia is a unique growing proliferation concern. Its need for nuclear energy makes denial 
of nuclear technology impossible and unethical, however its threat of nuclear weapons creates a 
grave concern for the dual use nature of this technology. Stringent care needs to be taken with 
whatever technology is and has been granted and in what form or to what extent. First and 
foremost, signing of the AP, CTBT, and revoking their SQP is strongly suggested. By adhering 
to these international safeguard regimes, Saudi Arabia will show proof in their claims of desiring 
only peaceful nuclear capabilities while also allowing limiting any covert actions. Denial of 
nuclear enrichment agreements is an obvious choice but will require further negotiating to give 
KSA confidence in their energy security. This can be done by utilizing the multinational fuel 
banks or enrichment center to ensure fuel supply. If KSA is not dissuaded against pursuing 
enrichment, Saudi Arabian ownership, operation, and technological know-how should be 
minimized. Further, limitation of their enrichment capacity will reduce future proliferation 
desires as it creates further obstacles. Nuclear proliferation is a concern with Saudi Arabia, and 
assuredly controlling enrichment is a key to preventing both proliferation and reducing nuclear 
weapons latency. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Foundation 
 
The policy recommendations described previously examine only a small aspect of the fuel cycle 
(mining, fuel fabrication, reactor operation, reprocessing and storage were not examined) of one 
country. However, it serves to show that each country will present unique challenges that need 
examining in full to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. One serious problem that will arise in 
any country’s nuclear fuel cycle is recycling and storage. Regardless of any geopolitical factors, 
a final repository will have serious concerns simply on the inherent time scale of the threat. 
Recycling is a practical and logical conclusion from a scientific stand-point but contains many 
political drawbacks. A fully developed solution to the inherent safety threats of recycling is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this thesis can contribute towards the solution, and the 
remainder aims for exactly that. The rest of this work is involved in the development of a 
safeguarding system to monitor special nuclear material using simple techniques that would be 
low cost and easily reproducible. Previous research has already established UV/Vis spectroscopy 
as being capable of monitoring material105-108. This chapter will outline the theoretical 
fundamentals which provide the basis for the experimental sections of this work and thus the rest 
of the thesis. 
 
4.1 Chemometrics 
The underlying physics which governs the system modeled and analyzed in this work is 
spectroscopy. Specifically, spectroscopy of the Ultra-Violet(UV) and Visible (Vis) spectrum, or 
UV/Vis. This is the measure of absorption of light from wavelengths from roughly 200 to 1100 
nm. The research chose UV/Vis as this is a region of the spectrum that many actinides and 
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lanthanides that are found in nuclear waste have absorption signatures, such as U and Pu. The 
process of absorbance occurs when light of these wavelengths excites electrons of atoms at a 
specific vibrational frequency, and the electrons absorb the energy from the photons which is 
converted to internal energy. For example, in Nd, the hypersensitive peak is around 578 nm and 
for Ho at 453 nm109,110. These hypersensitive peaks are specifically 4f electrons for lanthanides 
being excited and refer to transitions that are very sensitive to changes in the electron’s 
environment due to they follow electric-quadrupole selection rules while also having a total 
change of angular momentum less than two111,112,1113. These electronic conversions of energy are 
spectroscopically observable and modelable. The absorbance of light is calculated as the 
negative log of the ratio of final and initial intensity of light transmitted. 
𝐴 = −𝑙𝑜𝑔10 (
𝐼𝑇
𝐼𝑂
⁄ ) 
The probing of chemical systems and utilizing mathematical or statistical models to understand 
such systems is known as chemometrics. Much of the practicality of chemometrics is due to the 
linearity of the Beer-Lambert Law. 
𝐴 = ℓ ∑ ℇ𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
The Beer-Lambert Law requires six conditions to be valid. They are 1) Attenuators (absorbing 
species) must be independent from one another; 2) The solution must be homogenous across the 
light path; 3) The solution must not be turbid (meaning the species must not scatter light); 4) The 
incoming light rays must be parallel while traveling through the solution; 5) The light needs to be 
monochromatic; 6) The light cannot induce reactions or electronic transitions. The power of the 
Beer-Lambert law in chemometrics is that it describes a linear relation between absorbance and 
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concentration. Because the goal of the research is to create linear models, it is a prime candidate 
system for the research.  
 
4.2 PLS Modeling 
Before models are generated, data generally undergoes preprocessing to maximize the predictive 
ability of the model. Though there are numerous preprocessing techniques which can be used in 
many permutations, this research utilized autoscaling for the data. Autoscaling is the process of 
subtracting the mean from each variable then dividing by the standard deviation. The result is 
variables of mean-zero and a standard deviation of one. The advantage of autoscaling variables is 
it will normalize the baseline across samples; some samples may require individual baseline 
correction within a sample though that is not handled via autoscaling. By dividing by the 
standard deviation, all variables can be weighted the same, such that their variance influences the 
model more so than their absolute value. Figure 4.2 below illustrates an example data set before 
and after autoscaling. 
 
Figure 4.1. Representative Spectra of Data of Holmium, Samarium, and Neodymium Samples. 
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Figure 4.2. Change from Raw to Preprocessed Data of Varying Concentration Holmium, Samarium, and 
Neodymium Samples. 
 
The models generated in this work are generated through the method of partial-least squares 
(PLS). Partial least squares is a regression method in which data from a predictor matrix (Y) with 
samples listed down the y-axis and variables down the x-axis, and a response matrix (X) of equal 
design, are both projected to a single space to maximize the covariance of the two previous 
spaces114,115. In more traditional least squares solutions for a system of design Y=XB+E where 
B=(XTX)-1XTY. This is problematic in spectroscopy due to the collinearity of spectra. 
Collinearity is when multiple variables are highly correlated but not necessarily linearly 
dependent. This is the case in spectroscopy due to the absorbance at neighboring wavelengths 
being a product from the same electron excitation. This collinearity generally leads to XTX being 
singular, implying the inverse (XTX)-1 does not exist114. PLS regression circumnavigates this 
inverse deficiency by decomposing X into orthogonal scores and loadings called T and P 
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respectively, such that X=TPT115,116. Then the Y matrix is regressed onto the first columns of the 
T scores, where the number of columns chosen is the number of latent variables (LV’s) for the 
model. In other regression methods, such as PCR, the variables are chosen in order of decreasing 
variance captured in X117. However, as PLS maximizes covariance of X and Y blocks, the LV’s 
are ordered via decreasing covariance. One key advantage of PLS regression over other 
regression methods is it incorporates information from both X and Y blocks115. This is done 
specifically to maximize the covariance of the two data blocks. The covariance of X and Y is the 
correlation multiplied by the standard deviation. A mathematical representation is 
cov(X,Y)=E[(X-E[X])*(Y-E[Y])], where E is the expectation value. A more intuitive (but less 
practical due to loss of significance) is cov(X,Y)=E(XY)-E(X)E(Y). A general blueprint of the 
process of PLS is shown below. Another advantage of PLS-R is by using covariance, the output 
is in units of X*Y, which for models handled in this thesis are units of concentration, an easily 
interpretable output.   
 
  
4.3 A. Raw Data Matrices Multiplied to Create Covariance Matrix (S), Then Decomposed Into Singular 
Values (R) via Singular-Value-Decomposition. 
 
4.3 B. X Block Multiplied by Singular Vector to Create Scores (T) to Capture X Block Sample Variance. 
X Block (Spectra) Y Block
T
 
(Concentration) 
S Matrix Multiply 
Matrices SVD R 
R X Block (Spectra) Multiply 
Matrices 
T (Scores) 
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4.3 C. Y Block Multiplied by Singular Vector to Create Scores (U) to Capture Y Block Sample Variance. 
 
4.3 D. Loadings (P) Capturing X Block Sample Variance is Created from X Block and Scores. 
 
4.3 E. Loadings (G) Capturing Y Block Sample Variance is Created from Y Block and Scores. 
Figure 4.3. Schematic of PLS Algorithm. 
 
PLS-R maximizes the covariance of the X and Y blocks via the SIMPLS algorithm. The SIMPLS 
algorithm was developed in 1993 for PLS-R115. It is detailed in brief below. 
For each h=1,…,c where Ao=X’Y, Mo=X’X, Co=I, and c is given (the chosen number of latent 
variables), 
1. Compute qh, the dominant eigenvector of Ah’Ah 
2. wh=Ahqh, ch=wh’Mhwh, wh=wh/√ch, then store wh as columns of W 
3. ph=Mhwh and store ph as columns of P 
4. qh=Ah’wh and store qh into columns of Q 
5. vh=chph, vh=vh/||vh|| 
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6. Ch+1=Ch-vhvh’, Mh+1=Mh-phph’ 
7. Ah+1=ChAh 
  
The major advantage of the SIMPLS algorithm is the covariance matrix of X and Y is deflated, 
instead of the X and Y matrices being deflated individually. This is specifically of interest 
because it guarantees the allowance of different Y variables (metals) correlating to the same X 
variables (wavelengths). Whereas in the NIPALS algorithm (the dominant PLS-R algorithm 
before SIMPLS), deflation of the blocks separately creates the possibility of correlating only a 
single Y variable to a specific X variable115. 
 
After creating PLS models, they are inspected via their summary statistics. Primarily, statistics 
like Root-Mean-Square Error of Calibration and Cross-Validation (RMSEC & RMSECV) are 
good indicators of performance, though the RMSEP is more useful116,117. The RMSEP utilizes 
the full training set, alongside having a unique test set, thus is more accurate for validation 
purposes. Additionally, statistics such as Q-values and Hotelling’s T2 are utilized to verify a 
well-behaved model. To understand them, first requires understanding of the full errors. In a 
standard linear regression, some X block of data (absorbance in the case of this research), is 
decomposed into three matrices. 
𝑿 = 𝑻𝑷𝑻 + 𝑬 
where T is the scores which describes relationships between samples, P is the loadings which 
describe relationships between variables, and E is the estimated errors. In the Beer-Lambert law, 
these scores will elucidate the molar attenuation coefficients, since per variable, those are what 
change across samples, while the loadings will describe the concentration, since across 
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wavelengths, the concentrations are what are consistent114. The errors from electronic noise are 
used to compute Q-Residuals via 
𝑸𝒊 = 𝒆𝒊𝒆𝒊
𝑻 = 𝒙𝒊(𝑰 − 𝑷𝒌𝑷𝒌
𝑻)𝒙𝒊
𝑻 
where ei is the element in the i
th row of the errors E, Pk is matrix of retained loadings in the model 
where each column of Pk is a vector in the model and xi is a row (sample) in the X predictor 
block117. Q-residuals give an estimate of how well each sample fits the model. Thus, when looking 
at the Q-residual of a given model, a poor performing sample can be removed, or if sufficient 
samples have large Q-residuals, the model can be expanded. Of equal use is Hotelling’s T2, defined 
as 
𝑻𝒊
𝟐 = 𝒕𝒊𝝀
−𝟏𝒕𝒊
𝑻 = 𝒙𝒊𝑷𝒌𝝀
−𝟏𝑷𝒌
𝑻𝒙𝒊
𝑻 
where ti is the ith row of the scores matrix in the model, and λ is the diagonal matrix containing 
the eigenvalues of the latent variables117. If a model is considered as a best fit line through a set 
of data, the Hotelling’s T2 (T2) can be thought of as the distance from the center of the model in 
the plane, and Q values are the distance from the line out of the plane. Figure 4.4 below helps 
depict this.  
 
Figure 4.4 PLS Summary Statistics and Their Model Relation. Provided by Wise, B., Gallagher, N., and 
Roginski, R.114 
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With the description above, it becomes clear that T2 is a measure of the leverage of a data point. 
Higher T2 implies a higher weight on the model than other data points. This is not necessarily a 
bad thing; some data points could be more important than others. However, it requires careful 
inspection that the high T2 are good data points with low errors, or it will influence the model 
poorly117. Conversely, Q values are the distance from the line to the data point. High Q values 
are not good because they generally imply 
the data point is behaving according to 
another variable not being captured by the 
model. Sometimes this is a result of not 
using enough latent variables, and is a 
simple fix, though it can also indicate a 
sample was poorly made or influenced by 
another factor. An example is shown in 
Figure 4.5. There exist samples with both high Hotelling’s T2 and Q-Values, however, no 
samples have both. The samples with high Q-Values have low T2, implying the samples that are 
not modeled well are not contributing largely to the model, and the sample with large T2 (and 
thus a large influence), have a low Q-value indicating they are properly modeled. The ideal case 
would be samples with no high Q or T2 values, however, no samples with both is still acceptable.  
 
4.3 Power Analysis 
In chronological order of this thesis, a preliminary study into the neodymium-citrate speciation 
was done. As described further below, the results were inconclusive; the errors were far too 
large. Though mainly due to the speciation experiment being done via series dilution (thus the 
Figure 4.5. Sample of Summary Statistics for an 
Acceptable Model. 
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signal to noise ratio decreasing greatly), the spectral shifts due to speciation were too small for 
accurate modeling. Literature searches into improving sampling and modeling techniques all 
pointed to the necessity of a power analysis (PA). A PA is a way of probing how systems 
respond to changes in variables, in this case what variables had the largest impact on the 
predictive power of models118. Variables such as number of wavelengths included, concentration, 
and number of samples were probed to maximize model performance while minimizing 
resources consumption via sample creation. The goal was determining, via a PA, if the speciation 
of neodymium and citrate was even sufficiently modellable with the lab technology. If 
successful, this power analysis would describe a methodology such that similar models could 
easily be generated. It would also give knowledge a priori of how many samples are needed for 
accurate modeling, based on known quantities such as average sample concentration 
(determinable by the experimenter) and amount of electronic noise in the system. 
In traditional power analysis methods, the quantity of the effect size (ES) is determined via the 
nature of system in the analysis. The colloquial definition of ES is the extent to which the 
phenomenon is observable. Though vaguely described, this is the usefulness of the power 
analysis, because it allows for varied physical systems to be studied with the same tool, if all 
quantities are correctly defined. Though many more exist, the four candidates for ES are via 
regression, multivariate, covariance, and latent variable modeling, defined below. In regression 
model power analyses, the effect size is the ratio of the portion of the variance captured 
modeling signal (PVs) divided by the portion of the variance capturing error (PVE) multiplied by 
the ratio of the latent variables capturing signal (u) over latent variables capturing noise (v)118. 
This is congruent to the signal-to-noise ratio of the system. 
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𝑬𝑺 =
𝑷𝑽𝑺
𝒖⁄
𝑷𝑽𝑬
𝒗⁄
 
In multivariate modeling, the ES is more involved calculation, defined below. S is the number of 
variables examined. E is the matrix values of the errors, while H is the matrix of the sum of 
squares from the hypothesis (in our case, the estimation of the correlation between absorbance 
and concentration)118. 
𝑬𝑺 = 𝐿−
1
𝑆⁄ − 1 =
√|𝐸+𝐻|
𝑆
− √𝐸
𝑆
√𝐸
𝑆 , 𝐿 =
|𝐸|
|𝐸+𝐻|
= 1 − 𝑅2𝑌,𝑋 𝑅
2
𝑌,𝑋 = 1 −
|𝑅𝑌𝑋|
|𝑅𝑌||𝑅𝑋|
 𝑅𝑌𝑋 = 𝑋
𝑇𝑌,  𝑅𝑋 =
𝑿𝑻𝑿,  𝑹𝒀 = 𝒀
𝑻𝒀 
In covariance modeling, the effect size is standard deviation of the population means over the 
standard deviation of the same populations. The standard deviation of the population means is 
the normalized difference in means of samples with equal populations to the mean of the 
means118. 
𝑬𝑺 =
𝜎𝑚
𝜎
, 𝜎𝑚 = √
∑ (𝑚𝑖 − 𝑚)2
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 
For latent variable modeling, the effect size is the increase in R2 from adding the latest latent 
variable divided by one minus the same R2 118. 
𝑬𝑺 =
𝛥𝑅2
(1 − 𝑅2)
 
Each of these methods present their own merits for a power analysis, however, from literature, 
the regression model power analysis appeared the most applicable. This was partially due to a 
signal-to-noise ratio not only being easily observable, and also because PLS seeks to maximize 
signal while minimizing noise. 
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In a regression model power analysis, there are four key parameters, α,β, N, and ES. Type I error 
rate in the classical sense (the false-positive rate, or also the frequency in which the null-
hypothesis is true but incorrectly rejected) is α118. Similarly, the type II error rate (the false-
negative rate, or rate at which the null-hypothesis is incorrectly accepted) is β118. For ease of 
calculations, ‘power’ is used as 1- β. Explained in more detail later, the effect size for the 
UV/Vis models was believed to be the signal to noise ratio of the spectra. Finally, N is simply 
the number of samples for the system. The effect size is inversely related to α and β, as larger 
effects reduce both false negative and false positive rates. Further, increasing N (samples) 
decreases both α and β, while N has no influence on effect size and vice versa. 
 
4.4 Speciation and Advanced Reprocessing 
The last set of experiments for this thesis probed modeling speciation of complexes. Speciation 
is the process by which chemical reactions can generate multiple products based on the physical 
conditions of the reaction, such as temperature or pH. A case study of this is examined in this 
thesis because it is observable via UV/Vis. Specifically, the binding of a metal to a ligand 
changes the electronic structure of the Nd which can be observed spectroscopically119,120. The 
system studied is Nd binding with citrate in an increasing pH environment. As the pH increases, 
the complexing of Nd to citrate species becomes more favorable, and the composition of the 
solution changes with constant metal and ligand concentrations119. This phenomenon is of 
interest to study because it is a result from a separate physical entity of the metal itself, therefore 
monitoring process conditions via pH gives another layer of security for safeguarding. The 
neodymium-citrate system is of interest due to its relevance to advanced nuclear fuel recycling36. 
In advanced fuel recycling, the objective is not just to re-appropriate the uranium (and potentially 
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the plutonium) for reactor fuel, but also separate out specific actinides to lower the longevity of 
the nuclear waste. Recycling waste lowers the radioactivity by an order of magnitude much 
earlier in the waste lifetime. Though the end total radioactivity is not much less, it becomes safer 
sooner, alleviating the need for as robust long-lived safeguarding. By performing advanced fuel 
recycling, to transmute minor actinides americium and curium in the nuclear fuel, the fuel 
reaches the steady state radioactivity of the normal waste in five orders of magnitude less. 
Furthermore, the waste reaches a substantially lower radioactivity level, one that requires 
minimal safeguarding (below the natural uranium point, the toxicity of the chemicals will be 
more of a threat than the radioactivity). The final work of this thesis is to study the speciation via 
UV/Vis and model the species formation with pH changes in the ALSEP process. 
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Chapter 5: Materials and Methods 
 
5.1 Sample Preparation and Validation 
Metal samples were made by first dissolving neodymium nitrate (NdNO3), holmium nitrate 
(HoNO3), and samarium nitrate (SmNO3) in aqueous 1M nitric acid (HNO3). This created stock 
solutions which were validated via inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS). 
The stock solutions were 0.41 M for Ho, 0.43 M for Sm, and 0.48 M Nd. Samples were made in 
two sets, partially represented below. 
 Set 1 Set 2 
Number of samples with 3 metals 12 (16.9%) 6 (9.4%) 
Number of samples with 2 metals 23 (32.4%) 6 (9.4%) 
Number of samples with 1 metal 36 (50.7%) 52 (81.2%) 
[Ho]avg in 3 metals [0.076] [0.014] 
[Sm]avg in 3 metals [0.078] [0.014] 
[Nd]avg in 3 metals [0.088] [0.016] 
[Ho]avg in 2 metals [0.026] [0.021] 
[Sm]avg in 2 metals [0.027] [0.021] 
[Nd]avg in 2 metals [0.031] [0.024] 
[Ho]avg in 1 metal [0.060] [0.073] 
[Sm]avg in 1 metal [0.062] [0.088] 
[Nd]avg in 1 metal [0.070] [0.081] 
Overall [Ho]avg [0.052] [0.053] 
Overall [Sm]avg [0.053] [0.059] 
Overall [Nd]avg [0.061] [0.060] 
[Ho] Range [0.004] – [0.206] [0.001] – [0.412] 
[Sm] Range [0.004] - [0.213] [0.002] – [0.426] 
[Nd] Range [0.004] - [0.240] [0.001] – [0.480] 
Table 5.1 Statistics of Pure Metal Model Sample Sets. 
The objective of Set 1 was to test the interaction between multiple metals. It was of interest to 
study if PLS regression could correctly model sample concentration with samples containing 
more than one metal, or if the superposition of spectra would introduce larger errors. For this 
reason, nearly half of the samples contained more than one metal. For the second set, it was of 
interest to see the accuracy of model interpolation versus extrapolation, thus a wider set of 
concentration samples were generated. This was to allow for greater freedom in model 
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concentration ranges. This second set also allowed for a greater variability in average sample 
concentration while keeping sample concentration maximum and minimum constant. 
  
For the speciation experiment, potassium hydroxide stock was created by dissolving solid KOH 
pellets in micropure water. The 
stock solution of KOH was pH 
validated via a potentiometric 
auto-titrator. The KOH was 
utilized to pH adjust 
Neodymium-Citrate samples. A 
stock solution of citric acid was 
created by dissolving solid 
anhydrous citric acid granules 
(C6H8O7). This citric acid would 
then be contacted with dissolved neodymium, and then pH adjusted via the KOH stock. There 
were multiple batch samples, ranging from a 0.25:1 to a 4:1 ratio of neodymium to citrate. The 
Nd-Citrate was pH adjusted with a large range of KOH concentration adjustments, to provide for 
a rich pH profile. The first batch contained samples of varying neodymium and citrate ratios, and 
had KOH continually added to shift pH to above 7. The second batch had a constant ratio of 4:1 
citrate to neodymium in a 0.5 mL volume, and samples were contacted with 0.05 mL KOH in 
varying concentrations shown in Figure 5.1. Resultant samples ranged from pH of 1 to 7.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Varying Concentration of KOH utilized in 0.5 mL quantities for pH 
adjustment. 
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Samples of Dysprosium, Cerium, Europium, 
Erbium, and Praseodymium were created by 
dissolving their nitrate complexes in nitric 
acid to produce roughly 1 M solutions shown 
above. These metals were chosen due to their 
spectral overlap with target metals Ho, Sm, 
and Nd. Specifically, Erbium, Praseodymium, and Dysprosium were to mimic Holmium; 
Europium and Dysprosium were to mimic Samarium; and Cerium, Erbium, and Dysprosium 
were to mimic Neodymium.  
 
Figure 5.2. Stocks Made of Dysprosium, Cerium, 
Europium, Erbium, and Praeseodymium for False-
Positive Testing. 
Figure 5.3. Normalized Absorbance Spectra for 
Nitrate Lanthanide Species. Provided from Burghard, 
et al.121 
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Figure 5.4. Cary-14 and Jaz Spectrometer used for Absorption Measurements. 
 
Absorption measurements were taken by the set up shown in Figure 5.4. An OceanOptics 
Mikropack Deuterium/Halogen light source (1) generated light between wavelengths 230 to 
2500 nm, which transversed an OceanOptics short range fiber optics cable with a 400 µm 
diameter and a 2m length (2). The light traveled into a cuvette holder and dark chamber (3). In 
the cuvette holder was a Suprasil® quartz cuvettes (5) with a 1 cm pathlength and 200-2500 nm 
spectral range. The light then passed into an OceanOptics UV/Vis/NIR bifurcated cable (4) with 
a 400 µm diameter and 2m length. The light then was measured via an OceanOptics Jaz-
Spectrometer (6). Channel 0 covers wavelengths from 200 to 900 nm while channel 1 covers 500 
to 1200 nm. The integration time of the spectrometer was set to approximately 7 milliseconds for 
the first channel and 8 for the second. Lowering the integration time prevented the light intensity 
from maxing the signal to the detector, which would prevent calibration as the true value of the 
output of intensity would not be known. As shown below, each lamp had a characteristic 
intensity curve. 
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Figure 5.5 Integration Times to Observe Full Intensity Spectra of Both Spectrometer Channels. 
 
Once appropriate integration times were determined, spectra were recorded in the two channels. 
Channel two gave data from 200 to 890 nm, however nitric acid interference heavily skews the 
absorbance and thus was removed from 200 to 345 nm during preprocessing. 
 
Figure 5.6. Absorption Spectra of Neodymium in Both Channel 1 and 2. 
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The second channel recorded absorbance from 480 nm to 1200 nm, however, due to edge effects 
of the spectrometer’s limit, data was only kept from 500 to 1060 nm. The Cary-14 Spectrometer 
(with an operational range of 200-2600 nm and pictured left) was utilized to gather additional 
sets of spectra. 
 
ICP-MS operates by ionizing samples via plasma field created by varying magnetic field 
(specifically creating an electric field via electromagnetic induction). Samples are then separated 
based on a charge-to-mass ratio and creates a signal relative to concentration which is sent to the 
mass spectrometer. Concentration is then determined via calibration of a reference, in this case 
Indium (In). 
 
5.2 Data Collection 
After spectra were generated, a baseline correction was necessary due to an unnoticed drift in 
several samples. Displayed below is two near-identical spectra showing a change in absorbance 
above what is the ‘normal’ spectra, showing a flat baseline in Figure 5.7 (left). Unfortunately, the 
shift was observed only after several samples were collected with it present and was not handled 
before-hand. As re-collecting the blank sample and regenerating the spectra removed it, it was 
believed the source of error was electronic noise. However, some samples had already been 
disposed before this was caught. Because the shift was small, nearly-linear, and uniform, it was 
decided to perform a baseline correction on the spectra rather than recreating samples. The 
correction was performed by selecting points of non-zero absorbance in the spectra where 
previous research shows zero absorbance. These points where fit using least-squares to create a 
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polynomial to describe the shift. This polynomial was then subtracted from the base-shifted 
spectra, creating spectra with better agreement of previous research. The result is plotted below. 
 
Figure 5.7. Comparison of Spectra Before (left) and After (right) Baseline Corrections for Drift. 
 
5.3 PLS Modeling 
For PLS modeling, the data was cross-validated via contiguous blocks method. The 
preprocessing was set to autoscaling. This created the best results, as measured by RMSEC, 
RMSECV, and RMSEP. After models were created, the number of LV’s was selected. Latent 
variables were selected to capture the first and second order of magnitude of variance in both X 
and Y blocks. This was generally 5 LV’s, though some had 3 or 4. More LV’s generally 
introduced more noise than they captured variance. The exception was comparing models where 
it was desired to keep the number of LV’s constant.  
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Figure 5.8. Variance Captured Per Latent Variables from both X and Y Blocks. 
 
In traditional PCA and some regression methods, LV’s are created to have monotonically 
decreasing X variance. However, in PLS the desired output is maximized X and Y variance, thus 
the LV’s are organized so the sum total of variance of both blocks is maximized. For example, 
LV 3 and LV 4 would be switched in other methods, as LV 4 has more X variance than LV 3, 
but since the net variance (X plus Y) is higher, LV 3 comes first.  
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CHAPTER 6: Meta-Analysis of Multi-Metal Modeling 
 
Eventually a literature search on PLS modeling lead to the idea of conducting a power analysis 
on the system of interest122. The goal of the power analysis was to elucidate quantities that 
influenced modeling accuracy. As described in greater detail above, a power analysis is a 
heuristic to relate describable qualities of the system to type I and II errors. Specifically, the 
quantities of interest here are α, P, N, and ES. By completing a power analysis, it would allow 
modelers to know a priori how accurate their models could be based on the absorptivity of the 
materials of interest and the given spectrometer. This would allow similar systems to know how 
well safeguards would work without needing large volumes of material for samples. 
 
6.1 Power Analysis Quantity Calculation 
A preliminary study showed correlation between increasing concentration and decreasing the 
RMSEP. Unfortunately, the initial study was conducted on large N (50) models. This created a 
problem in that creating models with smaller average concentration would influence other 
variables that initially were believed could affect RMSEP, and thus potentially conflate 
variables. These variables included minimum sample concentration, maximum sample 
concentration, and total sample number. Based on the literature review described in chapter 4 of 
this thesis, it was determined that sample number would be investigated with signal-to-noise 
ratio of the UV/Vis spectra. The signal to noise ratio was defined as the absorbance of the spectra 
due to sample metal concentration divided by the absorbance fluctuations due to electronic noise. 
The process was the absorbance of pure metal samples were divided by their corresponding 
metal concentrations, creating approximate attenuation coefficients which were then averaged 
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over the samples of the same metals. This created a vector of molar attenuation coefficients. 
Then, the original absorbance of each sample subtracted the concentration of the other two 
metals multiplied by their coefficients. The product was the absorbance only due to the one 
target metal. The noise was calculated similarly, except all metals were subtracted out, leaving 
only random fluctuations. The standard deviation of blanks would also qualify as the noise of the 
system, and in fact was used to compare methods (standard deviation of blanks yielded an 
average absorbance of +0.0018, while the more involved method was +0.0026). The logic 
arguing for using a more involved calculation of noise was it was the most similar in calculation 
to signal. The explicit equation is below.  
 
𝑆𝑁𝑅 =
𝐴𝑛 − [
∑
𝐴𝑛
𝐶𝑛,𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑛,𝑖]
𝑗,𝑘
𝐴𝑛 − [
∑
𝐴𝑛
𝐶𝑛,𝑖
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑛,𝑖]
𝑗,𝑘,𝑙
⁄  
6.2 Effect of Sample Number 
After a formulation of SNR, sets of models were made with constant maximum, minimum, and 
average concentration. The results are plotted below. Larger N model sets had smaller variance, 
likely due to larger N models having more overlap in the specific samples included as compared 
to smaller N sets, which could have completely unique samples. The independence of SNR to N 
was expected; as SNR was the hypothetical ES, it should not change with N as theory predicts. 
However, RMSEP did not vary noticeably with N, which was not expected. As RMSEP is a 
measure of both type I and II errors, and errors should decrease with increasing N, it was 
expected RMSEP would decrease slightly with higher N. There is a stark increase in SNR at very 
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low sample number (3 & 6 N models) for Neodymium and a less noticeable effect for Holmium. 
However, due to the very low sample number, and the fact the SNR is calculated via averaging, 
the calculation is overinflating the signal and not able to correctly describe the noise of the 
system. 
 
Figure 6.1. Relation between Signal to Noise Ratio and Sample Number Showing No Improvement with 
Additional Samples. 
 
6.3 Effect of Signal-to-Noise-Ratio 
Generation of these model sets allowed further inspection of the influence of concentration to 
RMSEP. This showed an unexpected result of the ineffective nature of average sample 
concentration on RMSEP. The previous exploratory investigation was using samples with 
average concentration between 0.04-0.07 M metal, which appeared to have an influence on 
modeling performance. However, when models could be made at much lower sample 
concentration with the same or lower errors, this disproves the hypothesis of a correlation.  
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Figure 6.2. Average Concentration of Samples utilized in Modeling Does Not Increase Predictive Power. 
 
The power analysis was unfortunately not successful in elucidating methods for improving 
modeling and sampling techniques. It did, however, reveal that large N models are not necessary, 
and accurate models can be made with as low as 20 samples. The best option for future work for 
relating key variables to predictive power would be combination of variables (conducted via 
PCA or copulas) which may have a more observable and pronounced effect. Through the 
speculation of how to improve modeling accuracy though, our research turned to the idea of 
exploring the effect of number of wavelengths included in a model. The next chapter explores 
this concept in full. 
 
6.4 Effect of Max Concentration 
 
 After confirming no relation between the average sample concentration of metals and the 
predictive power of the models, we briefly explored the effect of the maximum concentration 
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present in the model and predictive power. Though the previous two studies did not hint the 
effect would be substantial, the data was readily available and easily modelled. Models were 
made with samples having a max concentration between 0.02 M and 0.5 M, utilizing models of 
Holmium, Samarium, and Neodymium. There was not a strong relation between max 
concentrations of samples as seen in Figure 6.3. At the tail end (roughly below 0.05 M max 
concentration) though it appears at the tail end there is a stark incline. This is due to the sample 
number approaching the point that sample number starts to have an effect and overfitting is 
occurring in the model (around M = 0.035). The region of 0.04-0.5 M has effectively no slope 
between the two quantities of interest while decreasing linearly with sample number. When 
comparing Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.1, the shift in RMSEP in the region below 0.04 M max 
concentration is congruent with the overfitting shown in Figure 6.1. Though not ideal to vary 
RMSEP with both max concentration and sample number, as the dependency of RMSEP on 
sample number was already elucidated, so the effect of sample concentration could be derived.  
 
Figure 6.3. Increasing the Max Concentration Does Not Improve Model Predictive Power Until Sample 
Number Becomes Too Low. 
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6.5 Detector Comparison 
The final meta-analysis of the models generated in this work was testing the discrepancies 
between samples recorded across different detectors. The samples were generated and verified 
with a model calibrated via ICP-MS. The same samples were then analyzed on the Carry-14 
spectrometer. The output is shown below. On the lower samples, there is almost perfect overlap 
between spectra. However, at higher samples, there is noticeable discrepancy, along with the 
Cary-14 recording maxed absorbance for several peaks. This inflate errors drastically, so these 
regions of the spectra were removed before modeling. 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Comparison of Absorbance of Neodymium at Four Concentrations Recorded on both Jaz and 
Carry-14 Spectrometers. 
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 The model indicated a slight discrepancy at lower values (0.07-0.4 M) while the largest 
error was in the 0.74 M Nd sample. The overall model discrepancy was an %RMSEP of 15% 
between the two detectors. However, without the last concentration set, the %RMSEP drops to 
below 5%. 
Modeling Results between Spectrometers 
 Measured 
Concentration 
Predicted 
Concentration 
0.1 M Nd 0.0794 0.0763 
0.2 M Nd 0.2032 0.1912 
0.4 M Nd 0.3983 0.4127 
0.8 M Nd 0.7419 0.8495 
RMSEP 0.0546  
%RMSEP 15.3610  
Table 6.1. Modeling Results Showing 15% Error in Average Prediction in Models. 
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CHAPTER 7: Wavelength Selection and Inclusion for Robust Modeling 
 
In the previous chapter, we examined the potential to estimate model efficacy based on minimal 
knowledge, to simultaneously save material and time while elucidating key modeling 
parameters. Unfortunately, tests were inconclusive on experiments to relate logical candidates 
(sample number, and signal to noise ratio) to desired outputs (%RMSEP). However, in our 
literature search and trials, we became interested in the effect of expanding spectra examined 
beyond peaks. Traditionally in chemometrics and UV/Vis spectra modeling, variable selection is 
a key component where only the peaks most sensitive to changes in the environment are 
utilized123,124. This is to minimize noise and improve accuracy. Though accuracy is still the main 
importance, because the model is made for special nuclear material safeguarding, robustness has 
a heightened emphasis. Thus, we wanted to make the model less susceptible to false positives 
that would misidentify material as our target metal. Our hypothesis was that by including 
wavelengths where our target metal does not absorb, but other metals could absorb, we could 
generate a model that negatively correlates target metal concentration to absorbance at this 
location, thus acting as a safeguard against conflating the two chemicals. However, to test the 
effect of including additional wavelengths to a model, we first needed to verify that specific 
wavelengths themselves were not more or less valuable; that mostly each wavelength contributed 
equal signal and noise. To accomplish this, we utilized a genetic algorithm to test the effect of 
including and removing specific wavelengths across the whole spectrum from our UV/Vis 
detector. The algorithm was prebuilt in the PLS package utilized for this research, and the output 
and results are detailed below. 
 
  
62 
 
7.1 Genetic Algorithm for Variable Selection 
 
Two representative graphs of the genetic algorithm are shown below. The genetic algorithm was 
utilized to probe the effect of changing wavelengths across models. In many chemometric 
models, some wavelengths provide more signal than noise. However, while using three metals 
that have absorbance peaks at mostly the entire spectra, this was not seen to be the case. From 
the high (254) end to low (14) end populations, no wavelengths stood out as particularly more 
useful than others. This is reflected in Figure 7.1 in that there is little to no vertical variation 
across wavelengths used (no colors being absent in a given region of wavelength). Though some 
wavelengths appeared to have little utilization (around 600 nm), close inspection showed that it 
could be used to produce models at both high and low end accuracy. If a given segment of 
wavelength was contributing significant errors, there would exist models at the high end of the 
Y-axis (consisting mostly of red colors), but no models at the low end (consisting of more blue 
hues). This implies the changes in wavelengths utilized in models across generations was more 
so influenced by the algorithm set random rate at which variables are switched on and off 
(referred to as a mutation rate in the genetic algorithm) than the actual performance. 
 
This result that largely no wavelengths in the spectra analyzed were better or worse as far as 
increasing model performance meant that we could randomly select wavelengths at will to 
observe the effect of changing the number of wavelengths utilized, and the particular 
wavelengths in general had little to no difference.  
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Figure 7.1. Testing Each Wavelengths' Contribution to RMSECV. Results Show Peak Selection Does Not 
Improve Model Performance. Effect of Wavelength on Model Performance is Indicated by Only Select Colors 
Being Present for a Given Variable Rather than the Entire Scale. 
 
As mentioned previously, traditionally, UV/Vis spectroscopy utilizes peak selection to maximize 
signal to noise ratio. As non-absorbing regions from spectra mostly constitute noise, they can be 
detrimental to concentration calculations or analysis. For this reason, optimization of peaks 
considered is standard. However, for the purpose of special nuclear materials safeguarding, this 
can lead to a pitfall, as demonstrated below. 
 
7.2 Additional Wavelength Effect on RMSEP 
 
A model was created on a set of pure neodymium samples, utilizing only wavelengths from 518-
528 nm. Though this is not the most sensitive peak in the neodymium spectra, it serves for 
demonstration purposes. Erbium, another lanthanide, has a very similarly absorbing peak in this 
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region. A test sample was examined using the pure neodymium model, and from the erbium 
spectra, determined the concentration of neodymium was 0.095 M. For reference, this 
neodymium spectra shown with close overlap was 0.068 M. This demonstrates that a model can 
confuse one metal for another when utilizing peak selection. For instance, when examining 
plutonium in nitric acid 
medium such as in Figure 7.2, 
the major peaks of plutonium 
are around 800 and 950 nm. As 
neodymium has peaks in both 
these regions, it could be used 
to trick a monitor into detecting 
plutonium. Generally, in 
processes, there will be 
purification steps to prevent 
this, but when considering the 
possibility of a nefarious actor, 
this cannot be overlooked. Including the small section of spectra from 540 to 545 nm did not 
have a large decrease in the accuracy of the neodymium model, as the RMSEP was 0.0052 M. 
However, when testing against the erbium contaminant, the new model estimated a neodymium 
concentration of only 0.011 M, which is an almost nine-fold reduction of concentration. This 
demonstrates that including additional spectral regions can improve model efficacy by reducing 
potential for confusion. The inclusion of additional wavelengths where the metal does not absorb 
at removes partial potential for a given species to be conflated with the target metal. By 
Figure 7.2. Plutonium Spectra in Nitric Acid Environment of Varying Concentrations 
Showing Spectral Shifts in the UV/Vis Region. Provided from Lee, Park, and Kim125.  
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induction, additional wavelengths add additional robustness. The difficulty though is determining 
where a potential contaminant could have additional peaks. An analysis of chemicals common in 
spent nuclear fuel would easily reduce much of the potential unintentional contaminants, but the 
possibility of nefarious confusion exists. A malicious actor with insider knowledge could 
purposefully choose a set of contaminants to mimic uranium or plutonium in the UV/Vis region 
that are not commonly found in spent nuclear fuel. 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Neodymium and Erbium Have Overlapping Peaks at 515-530 nm, Allowing for False-Positives. 
The following two graphs show a worst-case scenario for additional wavelengths included in a 
modeling set. Neodymium was utilized as a surrogate for contaminants to train the model as on 
absorbing peaks that are not the target metal, Holmium. In the worst case scenario, regions were 
chosen where neodymium absorbed, but none of the contaminants (Er, Eu, Pr, Dy, and Ce) did. 
This would simulate a scenario where a nefarious actor could pick contaminant(s) that absorbed 
where the target metal, Holmium, did, but at none of the locations the surrogate did.  
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Figure 7.4. Models Made with Holmium as the Target Metal, and Neodymium Used as Surrogate to Reduce 
False Positives. Wavelengths were Included Where Neodymium Absorbed and No Contaminants Did. 
In the above graph, there are six important quantities. The ‘NT’ tag represents Neodymium not 
included in the training set, while T has it present. Similarly, ‘NV’ is the surrogate not present in 
the validation set, while neodymium is present in the validation sets labeled V. The importance 
of including the surrogate in the validation set is to verify that the presence of the surrogatew 
would not influence the ability track the target metal. The sets labeled C have a validation set 
composed of solely contaminants (representing a diversion of material). The y-axis is a measure 
of %RMSEP, not raw RMSEP. This is the RMSEP divided by the average concentration of the 
target in the test set (Holmium) to make models comparable across different concentration sets. 
Additionally, using %RMSEP made the results more comparable because change in performance 
was the metric of interest, not just the raw value. For the containment set, which does not contain 
holmium, the average concentration was the concentration values that would lead to the same 
absorbance as the containments utilized. The x-axis does not correspond to the specific 
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wavelengths used, but rather the length of spectra, in nm, used. Thus 370 nm implies there were 
370 nm total of wavelength used. The entire length was broken into segments from 345 to 1100 
nm. The specific wavelengths utilized varied across three test sets to normalize for performance 
of certain wavelengths over others, though a genetic algorithm already implies the effect 
difference would be marginal. 
Abbreviation Meaning 
NT ‘Not in Training’ – Nd Surrogate Not Utilized 
in Training Set. 
T ‘in Training’ – Nd Surrogate Utilized in 
Training Set. 
NV ‘Not in Validation’ – Nd Surrogate Not 
Utilized in Validation Set. 
V ‘in Validation’ – Nd Surrogate Utilized in 
Validation Set. 
Nd|C=1 All Additional Wavelengths Included Are at 
Wavelengths Which Both Surrogate (Nd) and 
Contaminants (Er, Eu, Pr, Dy, or Ce) Absorb. 
Nd|C=0 All Additional Wavelengths Included Are at 
Wavelengths Which Only Surrogate (Nd) and 
No Contaminants (Er, Eu, Pr, Dy, or Ce) 
Absorb. 
C ‘Contaminent Set’ – Model Tested Against 
Set of Contaminents with Neither Target (Ho 
or Sm) or Surrogate (Nd). 
Ho/Sm Results for Holmium Target with Model for 
both Holmium and Samarium 
Ho/Sm Results for Samarium Target with Model for 
both Holmium and Samarium 
Table 7.1 List of Tags Describing Experiments in Chapter 7. Example: For graph labeled Ho Nd|C=0 and 
data set labeled RMSEP-NT-NV, this is the RMSEP of a model where the surrogate was not used in the 
training set (NT) nor in the validation set (NV) and additional wavelengths included were where the 
surrogate absorbed but the contaminent did not (Nd|C=0). 
 
The importance of comparing the two cases for the training set is to elucidate that inclusion of 
the surrogate does not reduce model performance when only the target exists, as this scenario 
will the most probable encounter for the model. 
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Figure 7.5. Aggregate of Model Performance Based on Not Including a Surrogate in Training Set vs. 
Including in Training Set. Overall, the Performance Did Not Decrease While Utilizing Additional 
Wavelengths. 
 
The above graph contains geometric means of the three validation sets (‘V’,’NV’, and ‘C’) 
compared as performance of including the surrogate in the training set vs. not including. The 
importance is to show that overall, model performance does not worsen when including more 
wavelengths when the training set included the surrogate. This suggests that additional 
wavelengths can be included into a modeling set that do not contain absorbance peaks of the 
target without worsening performance. The additional wavelengths included could potentially be 
at locations contaminants could have absorbing peaks. Though there is no significant decrease in 
error, there is an implicit accuracy gained in that a species absorbing at target metal peaks but 
also at additional peaks could be discriminated against. 
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Figure 7.6. Models Made with Holmium as the Target Metal, and Neodymium Used as Surrogate to Reduce 
False Positives. Wavelengths were Included Where Both Neodymium and Contaminants Absorbed. 
The above graph was a simulation of the best case scenario for the surrogate. Specifically, every 
additional wavelength included was at a wavelength where both the surrogate and contaminant 
absorbed. In this test, the trend argues more strongly for including additional wavelengths. 
Again, the set where the surrogate was included in the validation but not the test set was a much 
higher error.
 
Figure 7.7. Aggregate of Model Performance Based on Not Including a Surrogate in Training Set vs. 
Including in Training Set. Overall, Performance Was Constant While Utilizing Additional Wavelengths. 
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In the case of including only additional wavelengths where both the surrogate and contaminant 
absorbed, including additional wavelengths did not affect the performance when the surrogate 
was included in the training set. This suggests there is no setback to including surrogates, while 
the argument for inclusion is reducing potential for model confusion.  
 
Figure 7.8. Holmium and Samarium Models with Samarium Results. Including a Surrogate in the Training 
Set Improved Model Performance Compared to No Surrogate Despite the Additional Wavelengths Included 
Not Overlapping with Contaminant Absorbance Peaks. 
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Figure 7.9. Samarium Models with Results. Including a Surrogate in the Training Set Improved Model 
Performance Against Contaminants Compared to None. 
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Figure 7.10. Models Utilizing Multiple Target Metals had Enhanced Performance due to Both Targets Acting 
as Surrogates for Each Other. Including Additional Surrogates Further Improves Results. The Top Graphs 
Shows Results for Holmium, While the Bottom is for Samarium. 
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Figure 7.11. Models Utilizing Multiple Target Metals had Enhanced Performance Especially When All 
Additional Wavelengths Include Absorbance Peaks of Potential Contaminants.  The Top Graphs Shows 
Results for Holmium, While the Bottom is for Samarium. 
 
An additional set of trials using Samarium as a target metal was utilized, as shown in Figure 7.8, 
7.9 and bottom set of Figures 7.10 and 7.11. Similar to the Holmium set, the worst-case scenario 
showed that model confusion could be increased in the contaminant set with increasing 
wavelength. 
 
In the samarium set, the overall model performance decreased in both training sets with inclusion 
of additional wavelengths. The effect is more noticeable, likely due to the original set of 
absorbing wavelengths utilized to model Samarium were much smaller. 
In the best case scenario for the Samarium set, the models where the surrogate was included 
showed model performance increase with additional wavelength inclusion. Further, as in most 
cases, the variance between model set errors is significantly lower, implying more reproducible 
results. 
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The averaging of the three test sets shows inclusion of contaminants in the training set does not 
lead to model confusion but rather prevents it, as there is a very slight decline in error with 
additional wavelengths. 
 
Another set of models were generated using both Holmium and Samarium as target metals. The 
bolded Ho implies the figure is showing the output for the Holmium metal. The next set is the 
output for the Samarium metal, from the same model. The increase in error is less noticeable 
when including an additional model metal. This is likely due to the same effect of the surrogate 
playing into the target metal; the second target metal can act as a surrogate also and distinguish 
noise from signal. 
 
Though the worst-case scenario (in which no additional wavelengths absorb where the 
contaminant does) decrease accuracy of the model, its decrease is small, and when coupled with 
the low probability of occurrence, does not outweigh the benefit of potentially choosing a correct 
wavelength of absorbing contaminant. Therefore, it is argued that including additional 
wavelengths is worthwhile. Further, utilizing the full spectrum is the suggested path for 
modeling, because it does not decrease accuracy enough to outweigh the gained benefit of 
safeguarding against model confusion. 
 
7.3 Regression Vector 
After interrogating the model performance improvement via additional wavelengths, we 
inspected the effect on the regression vector, as this would confirm the additional wavelengths 
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are utilized to differentiate between metals. Four samples are shown below from a set of models 
where Holmium and Samarium are target metals, and additional wavelengths added (facilitating 
the change from short to long window) are at locations where both contaminant and surrogate 
absorb, though the absorbance of the contaminant is inconsequential, as this is modeling data, 
not validation. 
 
Figure 7.12. The Regression Vector Incorrectly Correlates Metal Concentration with Wavelengths with Non-
Absorption. 
The above graph shows the regression coefficients overlaid the absorbance spectra of the metals. 
In both the Samarium and Holmium regression vectors, there are wavelengths with very high 
coefficients (515 nm, 520 nm, 800 nm, and 820 nm) that do not correspond to absorbance of any 
present metal. This is the model correlating noise, and thus decreasing accuracy. In the case of 
Holmium, a metal absorbing from 820 onwards (and not at 800) will largely skew the predicted 
concentration. 
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Figure 7.13. Inclusion of Surrogate Reduces Correlation between Target Metal and Non-Absorbing Species. 
Further, the Correlation that Does Exist is Negative. 
Inclusion of the Neodymium surrogate reduced regression coefficients at non-absorbing 
wavelengths for Holmium and Samarium, and in most cases it became negative. This is due to 
the model being able to correlate absorbance not congruent with changes in metal concentration 
appear there. Thus, a contaminant absorbing there will reduce the calculation of concentration 
for the target metal. This is desirable because if a contaminant also absorbs at a band alongside 
targets Holmium or Samarium (causing an artificial inflation of prediction), the model will then 
reduce that calculation. 
 
  
77 
 
 
Figure 7.14. Including Additional Wavelengths Decreases Correlation between Target Metal and Non-
Absorbing Wavelengths, Providing Additional Discrimination. 
Expanding the window (number of wavelengths examined) has a positive though less 
pronounced effect. 
 
Figure 7.15. Including Additional Wavelengths and a Surrogate Contaminant Minimizes Correlation between 
Target and Non-Absorbing Wavelengths. Further, Correlation is Exclusively Negative. 
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The research here supports the hypothesis that expanding the window of wavelengths examined 
for a model can improve model accuracy when more than one species is present, whether that 
means contaminates or multiple metal targets. For the purpose of safeguarding, it is preferential 
to include more wavelengths because it allows for greater metal discrimination and thus more 
robust tracking and safeguarding. 
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CHAPTER 8: Speciation Modeling of Neodymium and Citrate 
The last set of experiments for this thesis were to track the speciation of Nd with Citrate at 
varying pH’s via UV/Vis. Literature already shows the concentrations for these species can be 
calculated from starting conditions and pH. 
 
8.1 Speciation Observance via UV/Vis 
The preliminary research into the speciation of Nd with Cit was to probe how large of an effect 
was observable. This was done by creating varying mixtures of Nd, Cit, and KOH. Absorbance 
was recorded as KOH was added to a mixture of concentrated Nd and Cit. The following graphs 
illustrate the most extreme cases; starting 1 M Nd, 1 M Citrate, and no KOH added to give a 
solution of pH ~1 for the first, then starting 1 M Nd, 1 M Citrate, and KOH added to give a 
solution pH of ~5. Note, the addition of the KOH diluted the Nd and citrate, but not significantly, 
and the absorbance is normalized to the same Nd and Cit concentrations.  
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Figure 8.1. Comparison of Spectra with Pure Neodymium (Top) and Complexation with Citrate (Bottom). 
The differences between spectra are subtle but present. Foremost, peaks at 350, 525, 560, 745, 
790, became more absorptive. This implies more light is being absorbed by this electron, 
which would be caused by a larger difference between LUMO and HOMO. Though 
difficult to see here, many of the peaks redshift, implying the electrons are more easily 
excitable due to longer wavelengths (less energy light) causing absorption. Finally, the 
most noticeable feature, is the splitting of the peak at 870 nm. Though it is not known, a 
potential explanation could be the light at that wavelength would excite the electron into a 
state occupied by a binding electron provided by the citrate. Figure 8.4 also depicts this 
shift across multiple spectra from pH 1 to 7. Figure 8.9 shows the most detailed changes, 
as only select peaks are showcased, and features such as the splitting of the 800 nm peak 
are more observable. 
 
Figure 8.2. 
Neodymium 
complexes with 
hydroxides at pH 
3 or higher when 
there is less than 
twice the 
concentration of 
Citrate as 
Neodymium. 
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When generating samples of Neodymium, Citrate, and Potassium Hydroxide, one unanticipated 
phenomenon occurred. Neodymium crashed out of solution at relatively low pH’s (higher than 3) 
when the ratio of Neodymium to Citrate was not substantial (at least 1:2 Nd to Citrate) as shown 
in Figure 8.2. Due to this causing the solution to turn turbid (and over the course of a day the 
molecules would precipitate), this 
made UV/Vis absorption impossible, 
as the Beer-Lambert law is no longer 
valid. After creating ten dozen 
sample sets, varying concentration 
of three components, it was clear 
that having more citrate than 
neodymium allowed for richer pH 
profiles without the metal 
precipitating. The graph below 
illustrates that samples could not be 
made with pH above 4 unless there was twice the citrate as neodymium. Once the ratio was 3, it 
allowed for a full pH profile up to pH 14. This data was gathered but not used, as it did not 
become relevant to observe species present over pH 7. 
Figure 8.3. Samples Made at Varying Neodymium to Citrate Ratio. With More 
Nd than Cit, Larger pH Profiles Were Possible. 
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Figure 8.4. Aggregate of Multiple Spectra from pH 1 to 7. Absorbance Increases and Redshifts for Most 
Peaks. 
A second set of experiments were ran using varying concentrations of constant volume additions 
of KOH. Due to results showing a higher Citrate than Neodymium concentration was desirable, 
all samples were at a ratio of roughly 3:1 ligand to metal. This changed the equilibrium slightly 
which is shown in the following section. 
 
8.2 Correlation of Speciation Change and Spectral Shifts 
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Though the speciation changes were observable, this did not immediately make them modelable. 
To do so required precise knowledge of the species concentrations. As stated previously, 
research by other groups had already determined the stability constants of the complexes present 
in the neodymium-citrate system119. Those values are listed in equations (1):(7). The neodymium 
species logarithmic stability constants are 6.94 for NdCit, 9.5 for NdHCit, 10.91 for NdCit2, and 
14.5 for NdHCit2. The three sole citrate species are 12.12 for H3Cit, 9.33 for H2Cit, and 5.23 for 
HCit. 
 
[𝑁𝑑𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝑁𝑑][𝐶𝑖𝑡]
= 106.94 (1) 
[𝑁𝑑𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝑁𝑑][𝐻][𝐶𝑖𝑡]
= 109.5 (2) 
[𝑁𝑑𝐶𝑖𝑡2]
[𝑁𝑑][𝐶𝑖𝑡]2
= 1010.91 (3) 
[𝑁𝑑𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡2]
[𝑁𝑑][𝐻][𝐶𝑖𝑡]2
= 1014.5 (4) 
 
 
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]3[𝐶𝑖𝑡]
= 1012.12 (5) 
[𝐻2𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]2[𝐶𝑖𝑡]
= 109.33 (6) 
[𝐻𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻][𝐶𝑖𝑡]
= 105.23 (7) 
 
Using these seven equations and constants, the two equations (8) and (9) representing a total 
neodymium and a citrate balance. Note, the subscript of ‘t’ denotes the total of the material. This 
is a known quantity because the starting quantity was measured. What is unknown is the sole 
species concentration of [Nd] and [H3Cit], representing the uncomplexed molecules.  
[𝑁𝑑]𝑡 = 10
−5.18 ∙
[𝑁𝑑][𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]3
+ 10−2.62 ∙
[𝑁𝑑][𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]2
+ 10−13.33 ∙
[𝑁𝑑][𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
2
[𝐻]6
+ 10−9.74 ∙
[𝑁𝑑][𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
2
[𝐻]5
+ [𝑁𝑑] (8) 
 
[𝐶𝑖𝑡]𝑡 = [𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡] + 10
−2.79 ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]
+ 10−6.89 ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]2
+ 10−12.12 ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]3
+ 10−5.18
∙
[𝑁𝑑][𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]3
+ 
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[𝑁𝑑] ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]2
∙ 10−2.62 + 2 ∙ [𝑁𝑑] ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
2
[𝐻]5
∙ 10−9.74 + 2 ∙ [𝑁𝑑] ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
2
[𝐻]6
∙ 10−13.33  (9) 
 
Equation 8 was rearranged to solve for the sole neodymium concentration in equation 10, and 
equation 9 was rearranged to find the undissociated citric acid concentration in equation 11. 
[𝑁𝑑] =
[𝑁𝑑]𝑡
(10−5.18 ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]3
+ 10−2.62 ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]
[𝐻]2
+ 10−13.33 ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]2
[𝐻]6
+ 10−9.24 ∙
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡]2
[𝐻]5
+ 1)
⁄
 (10) 
[𝐻3𝐶𝑖𝑡] =
{√(
10−2.79
[𝐻]
+
10−6.89
[𝐻]2
+
10−12.12
[𝐻]3
+
10−5.18∙[𝑁𝑑]
[𝐻]3
+
10−2.62∙[𝑁𝑑]
[𝐻]2
+1)
2
+4∙[𝐶𝑖𝑡]𝑡∙(2∙
10−13.33∙[𝑁𝑑]
[𝐻]6
+2∙
10−9.74∙[𝑁𝑑]
[𝐻]5
)−
10−2.79
[𝐻]
−
10−6.89
[𝐻]2
−
10−12.12
[𝐻]3
−
10−5.18∙[𝑁𝑑]
[𝐻]3
−
10−2.62∙[𝑁𝑑]
[𝐻]2
−1}
{4∙[𝑁𝑑]∙(
10−13.33
[𝐻]6
+
10−9.74
[𝐻]5
)}
 
(11) 
The end result was two equations (eq. 10 and 11) and two unknowns ([Nd] and [H3Cit]). These 
two equations were coupled which means they could not be solved directly. The equations were 
solved iteratively, by guessing an initial value of [Nd] and calculating a value of [H3Cit] via eq. 
11, then using that value in eq. 10 to calculate [Nd] and so on until the values stopped changing 
between iterations. Initial guesses were made between 0 [Nd], and the initial starting 
concentration of [Nd], representing 0 to 100% free [Nd]. Initial guesses did not have an influence 
on the final value. The results are plotted below. 
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Figure 8.5. Speciation Diagram for Four Citrate Complexes of Varying Protonation. Species are shown in 
percent of total citrate. 
The above graph is the speciation diagram of Citrate complexes. Note that the values are in 
percent of free citrate, meaning the citrate complexed with neodymium is not included. This is 
due to increasing pH creates more citrate bound to Nd than free in solution, which makes the 
data difficult to read, as the lower pH values are inherently higher in concentration.  
 
Figure 8.6. Speciation Diagram for Five Neodymium and Citrate Complexes Across pH Profile. Results Are 
Specifically of 3.2:1 Citrate to Neodymium Ratio. 
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The above graph is the speciation diagram of Neodymium complexes. Like the citrate, the values 
are in percent of neodymium, where 100% represents the total starting concentration of 
neodymium. 
After creating solutions of metal and ligand, the UV/Vis absorbance of samples were 
recorded. The results are shown below in contour plots. The first graphic is an overview of the 
data, while the second is more informative. The general trend is peaks undergo both 
bathochromic and hyperchromic shifts. Peaks at 590, 760, and 800 nm increase in absorbance at 
higher pH, while most peaks broaden while also shifting, to give their higher wavelength edge an 
around 5 nm shift across the pH spectrum. 
After recording the absorbance shift across the entire pH spectrum, we believed that the 
amount of variance between spectra was low, and especially considering it would be used to 
differentiate between five different species. As the protonation of a complex would not cause a 
drastic absorbance shift, we believed it would be easier to model the system using combined 
protonated and non-protonated species, which shifts the speciation curve as seen below.
 
Figure 8.7. Combining Protonated and Non-Protonated Species Allows for More Distinct Species. Results Are 
Specifically of 3.2:1 Citrate to Neodymium Ratio. 
This change is further supported when examining spectra at specific pH. The below 
comparison is samples taken at pH of a maximum of each species relative concentration. In the 
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combined species, there is noticeable differentiation between the three species, though the 
NdCit/H is more of an intermediate and does not have unique features not found in either pure 
Nd spectrum or the NdCit2/H spectrum. However, this is still preferred to the individual 
complexes spectrum, where each species does not contribute noticeably enough to change the 
spectra; specifically NdCit and NdHCit are hardly distinguishable, and is NdCit2 when compared 
to NdHCit2, which has nearly perfect overlap. 
 
Figure 8.8. Comparison of Spectra from Samples at pH with given Complexations are at Maximum. 
 
8.3 Modeling Results 
 More detailed graphs are shown below of individual peaks. In all four graphs, it can be 
seen the lower end pH (1-2) has a right edge around 5 nm less than at higher pH. Also, the 
intensity of the absorbance increases quickly with increasing pH. In the bottom left graph, 
showing peaks at around 865 nm, it can be seen at low pH, there is a single peak, however this 
peak splits into two peaks after around pH 3. These are indicative of speciation. 
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Figure 8.9. Examination of Peaks at Given pH. Absorbance Generally Increases and Red Shifts. Peak at 800 
nm Splits. 
The data was input to the PLS modeling software, and a model was created utilizing 7 
LV’s. The outputs are shown below. The %RMSECV is on average 23% for the metal 
complexes. The average CV predicted pH was 8% off the measured value. From examining the 
spectra shifts, the majority of the changes occurs between pH 1 to 4. This explains why CV 
predicted pH is more accurate between pH 1 to 4 (average 6%) than pH 4 to 7 (average 12%). 
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Figure 8.10. Cross-
Validation Results of 
Model Comparing Three 
Neodymium Citrate 
Complexes and pH. 
Results for Complexes are 
compared for Percent of 
Total Neodymium. 
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 With the speciation changes being more observable at lower pH, this manifests in the 
larger complexes (NdCit and to a more extent NdCit2 along with their protonated species) being 
more difficult to model, while pure Nd is the easiest modeled.  
 
Figure 8.11. Cross-Validation Results of Model Comparing Five Neodymium Citrate Complexes. Results are 
compared for Percent of Total Neodymium. Five Species Creates Much Worse Results. 
 Data was modeled with both combined species (defining NdHCit and NdCit as one, along 
with NdCit2 and NdHCit2), and separate species. Though originally we suspected the individual 
species would create very poor models, we needed to confirm it still. Direct comparisons of this 
is shown above in Figure 8.11. Overall, the model performance increased drastically when 
combined species were implemented rather than individual species, as the average %RMSECV 
of the metal complexes were 42% (decreased by 20% when combining species). The one benefit 
is the model tracks species from pH 1 to 5, as the less complex version stops seeing speciation 
changes after pH 4, therefore the more complex version, though less accurate, monitors changes 
over a wider pH window. 
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Figure 8.12. Cross-Validation Results for Prediction of pH based on Absorbance. Performance is Improved 
Marginally compared to Three Species Result. 
 After taking the model to higher complexity, we also reduced complexity to observe 
performance changes. All complexed species were combined as one variable, pH and 
uncomplexed Neodymium were left alone. The results of the RMSECV are shown below in 
Table 8.1 and Figure 8.13. The overall model accuracy increased from 20% to 16% though there 
was a decrease in complexity as all complexed species are lumped into one form. From a 
safeguard standpoint this could be undesirable as changes in pH at higher values (where the 
model already underperforms) would go undetected from a speciation standpoint as the sum of 
the double and single citrated species would not change. 
Variable Neodymium Complexed Nd pH Overall 
RMSECV 0.012 0.012 0.450  
%RMSECV 34.28% 7.38% 15.35% 15.72% 
Table 8.1. RMSECV Results for Model of pH and Neodymium in Pure and Complexed Form. 
Variable Neodymium NdCit/H NdCit2/H pH Overall 
RMSECV 0.011 0.011 0.022 0.350  
%RMSECV 31.93% 16.26% 23.16% 11.92% 19.46% 
Table 8.2. RMSECV Results for Model of pH, Neodymium and Complexed Citrate Species. 
Variable Neodymium NdCit NdHCit NdCit2 NdHCit2 pH Overall 
RMSECV 0.011 0.012 0.028 0.023 0.033 0.368  
%RMSECV 31.17% 63.93% 54.73% 36.22% 103.79% 12.56% 41.56% 
Table 8.3. RMSECV Results for Model of pH, Neodymium and Individual Citrate Species. 
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 The research here supports that the speciation of metal ions can be observed and modeled 
via UV/Vis absorption. Though the conecentrations of species were less accurate than the model 
would need be for materials safeguarding, it shows there is potential for doing so. Further, the 
pH can be tracked relatively well that can be indicative of process changes. This is an attractive 
potential for this system as this creates another physical process unique to current safeguard 
methods that would require falsification in order for an inside actor to divert material. 
 
 
Figure 8.13. Cross-Validation Results of Model Comparing Two Neodymium Based Species. Results are 
compared for Percent of Total Neodymium. Two Species Creates Better Results at the Cost of Complexity.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
 The objective of the thesis was to understand how used nuclear fuel recycling can be 
better implemented to mitigate the intensity of the destruction climate change will bring. By 
heavily decarbonizing our electric grid via nuclear energy, climate change goals become both 
realistic and affordable. However, an increase in nuclear energy prevalence necessarily increases 
the threat of nuclear proliferation126. Thus, the thesis sought how to mitigate this problem, so the 
threat to life and wellbeing is reduced, and not just challenged in a different way. Research 
sought to understand and suggest solutions to both political and scientific challenges of nuclear 
fuel recycling. The process of nuclear fuel recycling will inherently threaten life. However, the 
severity and probability of this threat can be minimized to where its benefit vastly outweighs its 
cost. 
 As nuclear energy spreads across the globe, it will undoubtedly cross borders into less 
safe territories. Denying long-term clean energy will have severe ramifications, and thus 
minimizing the nuclear process in this region directly minimizes the danger. International fuel 
banks, recycling centers, and enrichment plants can all contribute to taking large key elements of 
nuclear threat out of less secure countries. This also grows international cooperation and 
introduces a new level of scrutiny as it removes one country’s complete oversight of the process. 
This method of mitigating nuclear threat can help countries such as Saudi Arabia meet their 
energy needs while denying them the back routes to weapons development. 
 Parallel to suggesting a safer fuel recycling process on the international level, the thesis 
also sought to explore safety improvements on an industrial level. The tracking of special nuclear 
material in close to real time does not completely guarantee the safety of the process but resolves 
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a major security threat via inside actors. Utilizing UV/Vis spectra absorption to track both 
uranium and plutonium can monitor specific metals in close to real-time, while also being 
noninvasive and inexpensive. 
 The research sought to provide insight into the practicality and ease of multi-component 
modeling. As there exists an array of advanced fuel recycling techniques, and the complexity 
increases when each reactor will have a unique spent fuel make up, it is impossible to provide 
one catch-all model for tracking material. By studying how to successfully model materials in 
solution, it would allow for high reproducibility of the models made in this research. Rather, 
being able to make models easily was seen as more practical. Additionally, as fuel recycling is 
seen as an inherent threat to life and safety, the research focused on minimizing security risks. 
Specifically, the research covered expanding spectra windows examined to create robustness 
against an inside actor from diverting material. Finally, as material in nuclear fuel recycling 
undergoes a multitude of chemical processes at varying conditions, it was of interest to study the 
spectra shifts due to speciation. Tracking the speciation via the UV/Vis absorbance would create 
an additional hurdle for a nefarious actor to cross in order to divert material. 
 The research of this thesis sought to provide information to how nuclear fuel recycling 
can be done in a more safe way to minimize proliferation threat. Nuclear proliferation is a 
problem society will have to live with and will take a momentous work to overcome, but climate 
change is not a problem society can live with. The consequences of our damage to the 
environment are too grave for society, and great action must be taken to reverse it. It is for this 
reason that nuclear energy is our best path going forward. It can reduce emissions far beyond 
what other technologies are capable of, and doing so safely must be our priority as a society to 
survive. 
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